WTO Working Papers

Discussions about international capital movements raise extremely important and controversial questions. Why should countries open up their capital accounts, especially considering that unrestricted international capital movement is a relatively new phenomenon? For example, many OECD countries have not eliminated their foreign exchange restrictions only until the 1980's. If the answer is unequivocally affirmative, does it matter how fast should countries do so? Should they wait until "all essential pieces" of the policy package are in place before they eliminate all restrictions? How are international capital movements related to domestic financial sectors? Is there a difference between opening to competition an industry such as car manufacturing as compared to the banking sector? Should the opening of the banking sector be governed by different rules? Rules about foreign exchange restrictions are already in place in the IMF Articles. Until recently, the IMF Articles only called for the elimination of foreign exchange restrictions on the current account. The ongoing discussion and the controversy about globalization that calls for the capital account liberalization introduces, therefore, a relatively new element into the whole discussion. These questions have also implications for the World Trade Organization. It is well known, that the Uruguay Round Agreements have already provided a coverage for a number of aspects that are directly related to foreign investment. Rules established elsewhere such as in the context of changes to the IMF Articles will obviously have an important bearing for the implementation of rules agreed in the Uruguay Round. This raises a variety of other questions in the mind of some observers. Who should decide about the rules on capital account liberalization? What rules? IMF? What is the role of the WTO? How does one link the two? All of the questions raised above are clearly extremely important and most of them are discussed in the following paper by John Williamson. Mr. Williamson's presentation is based on his lecture and discussion which was delivered on 17 June 1999 at the WTO. The actual text that follows is a transcript of that lecture.

The customs union between the European Union (EU) and Turkey, which entered into force in January 1996, extended and deepened the Association Agreement, signed in 1964 and which foreshadows full EU membership for Turkey. In a number of areas, the new relationship goes beyond the minimum requirements for a customs union: Turkey is also having to implement a number of measures which are part of the acquis communautaire, similar to those applicable within the EU. This paper addresses the question whether this adoption of the EU model is beneficial to Turkey and third countries. The importance of this issue is the spreads of this model through the extension of the EU itself and the building of an increasing web of partnerships between the EU and other countries in Central and Eastern Europe as well as Mediterranean countries. Moreover, other regions are looking at the EU model as a way in which to deepen their own preferential trading arrangements.

This note discusses capital controls using insights from the trade policy literature. It highlights some key issues that have been neglected in the current international debate on capital controls. Capital is tradable in the same way as many goods and services are. As a result, much of the analysis pertaining to trade and trade policy in goods and services applies with equal force to capital movements. Free trade is typically the best trade policy, no matter whether it is trade in goods, services or capital. But if investor behaviour and the prevailing policy environment are not conducive to immediate free trade, the choice of instrument for controlling capital flows becomes important. Tariffs and other price-related restrictions are preferable to quantitative restrictions or prohibitions because: (i) they cause less rent seeking, and (ii) they do not insulate the domestic market from price changes and innovations in international markets.

It has sometimes been argued that "globalization" benefits only a small number of countries, and that this leads to greater marginalization of excluded countries. This paper argues that globalization is not necessarily biased towards greater concentration in international trade and investment flows. Marginalization is more likely to be explained by domestic policies in relatively closed countries. The paper shows that among relatively open economies, the concentration of international trade and investment flows has declined over the last two decades, whereas the opposite is true among relatively closed economies. Thus, marginalization is not intrinsic to globalization. Key Words: Globalization, international trade and investment flows concentration.

The paper studies empirically the fiscal policy instruments by which governments try to influence election outcomes in 24 developing countries for the 1973-1992 period. The study finds that the main vehicle for expansionary fiscal policies around elections is increasing public expenditure rather than lowering taxes, and public investment cycles seem particularly prominent. Institutional mechanisms which constrain discretionary expenditure policies and which strengthen fiscal control are therefore worthwhile considering to prevent opportunistic policy making around elections.

Management of capital inflows has unexpectedly become a major challenge in transition economies. These countries were expected to have an insatiable demand for foreign capital, and an excess demand for capital inflows was, therefore, predicted by most observers. Foreign investors are also known to be very selective in their choice of markets, and these countries were a big unknown. Moreover, macroeconomic policy in these countries has been dominated by the objective of disinflation. We explain in this paper the reasons why some transition countries have been an attractive market for foreign investors and how important has foreign capital been for these countries. But the bulk of the paper provides an assessment of government policies to manage foreign capital inflows. We evaluate the policies against the background of different government objectives and in terms of the actual policy instruments used by the monetary authorities, the timing and sequencing and the costs of these interventions. We argue that the initial responses to capital surges were poor; the authorities were reluctant to adjust their original policies and learn from the experiences elsewhere. Eventually, their policy responses were changed but until the costs of inertia became too high. The authorities have effectively used sterilization policies, more flexible exchange rate policies combined with tight monetary and fiscal policies. They also understood that an effective management of capital flows must start from well functioning markets, and have been prepared to adopt structural policies whenever market imperfections could be identified.

Using the influence-driven approach to endogenous trade-policy determination, we show how a free-trade agreement (FTA) with rules of origin can work as a device to compensate losers from trade liberalization. The FTA constructed in this paper is characterized by external tariff structures that are negatively correlated across member countries, ensuring efficiency gains and, through reduced average protection, compatibility with the multilateral trading system's requirements. It is also politically viable, and we demonstrate that, in the countries concerned, governments are willing to include its formation in the political agenda in spite of the fact that, in equilibrium, political contributions from producer lobbies decline after the agreement.

Market access negotiations in merchandise trade at the multilateral level cover tariffs and non-tariff measures (NTMs). While tariffs have been substantially reduced in earlier rounds, they remain high in certain areas and further reductions involve a number of complex technical issues. Some formulae approaches, not used in the Uruguay Round, seem more favourable to developing countries. Elimination or phased reductions of NTMs in agriculture is one of the main areas for further market access negotiations in trade in goods. However, most NTMs are now the subject to negotiations on the rules under which they may be applied, e.g. in the areas of contingency protection and technical barriers to trade.

This paper analyses the results of the financial services negotiations under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) at the World Trade Organization (WTO). It shows that the negotiations have contributed to more stable and transparent policy regimes in many developing and transition countries. The wide range of market access and non-discrimination commitments should advance the process of progressive liberalization. The commitments do not compromise the ability of countries to pursue sound macroeconomic and regulatory policies. However, other aspects of the outcome do raise some concerns. First, there has been less emphasis on the introduction of competition through allowing new entry than on allowing (or maintaining) foreign equity participation and protecting the position of incumbents. Secondly, even where immediate introduction of competition was not deemed feasible, not much advantage has been taken of the GATS to lend credibility to liberalization programmes by precommitting to future market access.

The paper studies empirically fiscal policies around elections in 25 developing countries as affected by the exchange regime. It is argued that countries with flexible exchange regimes are less likely to engage in expansionary fiscal policies before elections because such policies can result in devaluations and inflation which affects government popularity adversely. The empirical results show that governments indeed try to improve their re-election prospects with the help of expansionary fiscal policies only in countries with fixed exchange rates and adequate reserve levels. For some countries, this raises doubts about the usefulness of fixed exchange rates for stabilizing the macro economy, unless reforms of the institutional framework reduce the scope for election-oriented fiscal expansion.