About the WTO

This paper investigates the social interactions performed by immigrants in France. A framework for immigrant’s choice of location is based on recent studies on non-market interactions which explains how migrants concentrate. Applying data on the distribution of immigrants in 95 French provinces, the social interactions are subsequently estimated. This “social component” of migration is then tested on international trade, providing a direct measure of the impact of social networks on the economy.

In a rapidly changing trade environment, marked by economic slowdown and impasse in the Doha Round, the success of the WTO in promoting and legitimizing the rules-based multilateral trading system rests, to a large extent, on maintaining effective relations with civil society, including non-governmental organisations. This paper provides an overview of the WTO's rules and practices for transparency and engagement with NGOs. First, it looks at both internal and external transparency. Second, it deals with how the WTO engages with civil society and illustrates how this has evolved over time. Third, it looks at how NGOs and civil society contribute to the dispute settlement process. In concluding, it explores whether there is scope for enhancing the WTO's current practices for engagement with NGOs, and if so how. It also offers some suggestions on how NGOs can render the WTO more accountable to the public. One area in which the WTO's practices for transparency and channels of engagement with civil society actors has evolved considerably is dispute settlement. Although only WTO members can bring a dispute to the WTO, the practice of opening hearings to the public, upon the parties' request, and inviting contributions from non-members, including NGOs, shows to what extent WTO transparency and engagement with civil society have improved in recent times. In particular, NGOs have assisted parties to a dispute prepare their briefs. This has included annexing studies to the parties's submissions, submitting amicus curiae briefs, and supporting the panel as experts under Article 13 of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). Forging links with civil society is a formidable task for any intergovernmental organization; at issue are the rights of governments to set WTO policy and the need to respect the voices of those without a vote. Although the WTO's rules for engagement with civil society based on Article V:2 of the Marrakesh Agreement and further elaborated in the 1996 Guidelines have not been updated, the actual practices for engagement have evolved considerably over time and it is likely that they will continue to be improved upon in the future.

This paper deals with claims, recently raised in various circles, that structural faults in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) have prevented WTO Members from advancing services liberalization under the Agreement. The GATS is generally associated in this context with a bottom-up (positive-list) scheduling approach where the sectors on which trade commitments are undertaken are selected individually. This is claimed to be less efficient, in terms of liberalization effects, than alternative approaches under which everything is considered to be fully committed unless specifically excluded (top-down or negative listing). However, a closer look at services negotiations conducted in various settings, including the Doha-Round process, WTO accession cases and different types of regional trade agreements, suggests that such structural issues have limited, if any, impact on the results achieved. What ultimately matters are not negotiating or scheduling techniques, but the political impetus that the governments concerned are ready to generate.

This paper investigates how RTAs treat disputes concerning their TBT provisions, in particular whether they treat them differently from other types of dispute, and how they deal with any potential overlap with the WTO when the substantive obligations of the RTA and the WTO TBT Agreement are the same (or similar).

The WTO TBT Agreement obliges governments to use international standards as a basis for regulation, yet leaves a degree of flexibility with respect to the choice of standard, and the manner of its use. This interplay between obligation and flexibility has given rise to tension in various fora of the WTO. This paper brings together these three distinct strands of WTO work to illustrate core aspects of the international standards debate at the WTO. In our analysis we first briefly outline the nature of the discipline in the TBT Agreement itself; next, we describe where and how the discussion arises in the WTO; and, finally, explore some implications of governance of international standard setting. We propose that greater regulatory alignment could be achieved through a renewed focus on the procedures of setting international standards (the how), and greater emphasis on robust technical/scientific underpinnings of such standards (the what).

The objective of this paper is to assess the adequacy of multilateral rules dealing with monopolies and state enterprises, particularly in the domain of services. This paper argues that since these rules depend largely on the other obligations undertaken by Members, a variety of exemptions and exclusions have weakened the rules considerably. Furthermore, liberalization of services trade, aided by negotiations under the GATS, is leading to changes in market structure and the pattern of ownership. These changes imply that government-mandated monopolies or non-competing oligopolies are disappearing from the infrastructural services for which Article VIII of GATS is most relevant. The behaviour of dominant suppliers that often remain does not fall within the scope of Article VIII and has been addressed by creating other disciplines. The paper assesses how much emphasis needs to be placed on pro-competitive regulation to ensure competitive market conditions and argues that there is a need to strengthen Article VIII and widen its scope to deal with certain generic problems.

The paper discusses the experience to date with the implementation and application of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), some ten years after its entry into force. One striking observation is the smooth functioning of the Agreement, which has created far less tensions and frictions, including at Ministerial Meetings, than its difficult negotiating history might have suggested. This is due in large part to a high degree of flexibility at several levels: Members have more scope than under the GATT to depart from common horizontal obligations, in particular the MFN principle; they are able to adjust the breadth and depth of their trade commitments (market access and national treatment) to particular sector conditions; and they face less constraints, if any, in the use of trade-related policies such as subsidies, export restrictions, or domestic regulatory interventions. An additional source of flexibility is the uncertainty still surrounding a few core concepts of the Agreement and their sometimes daring application in individual schedules. While the ongoing negotiations also provide an opportunity for technical corrections of scheduling problems, the basic (built-in) flexibility elements of the Agreement - including the bottom-up approach of undertaking sector commitments and the possibility of inscribing limitations under individual modes - will, of course, persist. (Their actual relevance may, nevertheless, differ significantly between 'old' Members and countries negotiating their accession to the WTO.) Given the broad reach of of the Agreement in terms of membership, sector application, and modal coverage, flexibility may be considered a conditio sine qua non. There is little reason to believe that a more rigid structure would have been acceptable to Uruguay Round participants and, even if so, that it would have proven stable and resilient over time. However, flexibility may come at a cost: lack of meaningful obligations across a reasonably broad range of service sectors. Vested interests may find it far easier than under the GATT to defend their privileges and defy more rational and harmonized trading conditions. While the paper discusses formula-based approaches that have been proposed to improve the quantity and/or quality of sector commitments within the existing framework of GATS, there should be no illusion about the scope for technical solutions to what constitutes a political and institutional challenge.

The frequency, severity and economic impact of natural disasters are growing. Import surges resulting from disaster-response efforts can highlight underlying structural failings in the border clearance regimes of disaster-affected countries.

The process leading to WTO accession is complex, requires solid domestic coordination mechanisms in the acceding country, a rethinking of its economic and trade policies and significant domestic structural reforms. It often implies the creation of new institutions designed to coordinate and implement the policies at the national level, as was the case in Georgia.

As governments increasingly adopt policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, concern has grown on two fronts. First, carbon leakage can occur when mitigation policies are not the same across countries and producers seek to locate in jurisdictions where production costs are least affected by emission constraints. The risk of carbon leakage raises questions about the efficacy of climate change policies in a global sense. Secondly, it is precisely the cost-related consequences of differential mitigation policies that feed industry concerns about competitiveness. We thus have a link between environmental and competitiveness perspectives that fuses climate change and trade regimes in potentially problematic ways as governments contemplate trade actions to manage the environmental and/or competitiveness consequences of differential climate change policies. On the trade side of this relationship, we have the reality that the GATT/WTO rules were not originally drafted to accommodate climate change policies and concerns. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relevance of certain WTO rules to the interface between climate change and trade, focusing in particular on border measures, technical regulations on trade, standards and labelling, and subsidies and countervailing duties. It concludes that in the absence of clear international understandings on how to manage the climate change and trade interface, we run the risk of a clash that compromises the effectiveness of climate change policies as well as the potential gains from specialization through trade.