WTO Working Papers

The status of public services is one of the most hotly debated issues surrounding the GATS. There are two approaches to distinguish such services from any other services: an institutional approach that focuses on the legal and institutional conditions governing supply (e.g. ownership status, market organisation), and a functional approach based on the policy objectives that may be involved (e.g. distributional and quality-related considerations, concepts of universal access). Given the wide range of institutional arrangements that exist in different jurisdictions, with significant variations over time, the former approach does not appear appropriate. The services provided by government-owned facilities, whose costs are covered directly by the State, may well be indistinguishable, for all practical purposes, from the services provided by private commercial operators, whose users (students, patients, passengers, etc.) are reimbursed. This paper discusses the relevance of the GATS for different organisational settings - from government monopolies to regulated and/or subsidized private provision - that may be used by WTO Members to meet typical public service objectives. It turns out that virtually all forms of organisation can be accommodated within the framework of the Agreement. To fully exploit its opportunities and avoid unpleasant surprises, however, governments would need to thoroughly analyse the relevant provisions in the light of their own policy objectives.

Over the past months, it has become increasingly clear that the services negotiations under the Doha Development Agenda will not produce significant improvements on current commitments unless major new impetus is provided. In an introductory section, this paper discusses various impediments, from the perspective of participating governments, that may explain the lack of negotiating momentum to date. It then provides an overview of existing commitments under the GATS (by sector, mode of supply, and level of development) and of the initial offers that had been tabled by early 2005. Despite the substantial benefits that may be associated with the liberalization of services trade, the GATS has obviously not yet lived up to ambitious expectations. For example, on average across all WTO Members, only one-third of all services sectors have been included in current schedules of commitments; and many entries have been combined with significant limitations on market access and national treatment or with the complete exclusion of particular types of transactions (modes of supply) from coverage. While the ongoing services negotiations provide an opportunity to complement the rule-making efforts of the Uruguay Round with genuine market opening, many governments apparently have found it difficult, despite generally more restrictive access regimes and, thus, potentially higher gains from liberalization than in merchandise trade, to undertake or envisage economically significant bindings across a broad range of services. Five years after the inception of the services round, current negotiating arrangements, based mainly on (bilateral) exchanges of requests and offers, may need to be complemented by common points of reference to provide greater focus and guidance.

This paper estimates the impact of liberalization of temporary movements of individual service suppliers on trade in goods and services. In particular, the paper looks at the impact of the so-called forth mode to provide a service on trade in services under the other three modes: cross-border service supply (Mode 1), consumption abroad (Mode 2) and commercial presence abroad (Mode 3). Estimates are obtained using a gravity model of trade augmented for a measure of temporary movements of service suppliers. Estimates of the size of a country’s Mode 4 trade in services are based on specific information regarding the number of temporary foreign workers occupied in the service sector and their estimated average earnings, thus overcoming the limitations of traditional measures of Mode 4 based on remittances or compensation for employees. We find a positive and significant effect of temporary movements of service providers on merchandise trade and services trade under Mode 1 and 3. No significant relationship is found between services trade under Mode 2 and Mode 4.

This paper explores the role that quality of infrastructure has on a country's trade performance, estimating a gravity model that incorporates bilateral tariffs and a number of indicators for the quality of infrastructure. The paper looks at the impact of the quality of infrastructure (road, airport, port and telecommunication, and the time required for customs clearance) on total bilateral trade and on trade in the automotive, clothing and textile sectors. In order to obtain unbiased estimators, multilateral resistances for tariffs and remoteness are introduced in the gravity equation. Moreover, the robustness of the results is tested by estimating a fixed-effect model, where bilateral indexes of the quality of infrastructure are included. The results can be summarised in four main findings: (i) bilateral tariffs, generally neglected in gravity regression of bilateral flows, have a significant negative impact on trade; (ii) quality of infrastructure is an important determinant of trade performance; (iii) port efficiency appears to have the largest impact on trade among all indicators of infrastructure; (iv) timeliness and access to telecommunication are relatively more important for export competitiveness in the clothing and automotive sector respectively.

This paper analyses to which extent domestic institutions affect trade flows. We use two complementary approaches, one focusing on the size of total trade flows and one focusing on bilateral trade patterns (gravity equation). Besides, we control for two other domestic policy variables: trade policy and domestic infrastructure. We find that the quality of institutions has a positive and significant impact on a country’s level of openness. Domestic tariffs have no statistically significant impact on their own, but do affect total trade flows when combined with good institutions. Domestic institutions also have a positive and significant impact on bilateral trade flows, but the parameter of our institution variables is reduced by almost a half and may turn insignificant when the quality of domestic infrastructure is included in the regression.

This paper explores the role of producer services and ICT on international outsourcing. The motivation for outsourcing is to focus on core business and improve efficiency and outsourcing companies usually outsource a number of functions and the efficiency gains depend on the ability for the suppliers to deliver the required quality at the right time. The timeliness of delivery and the fulfilment of quality standards depend critically on the availability of producer services. I therefore argue that international outsourcing can best be understood within an analysis framework of many suppliers that are interdependent, and the O-ring theory of production is such a theory. The paper first presents and modifies this model and then explores its predictions in an empirical analysis of the determinants of international vertical specialization as defined by an index developed by Hummels et al. (2001). The index is calculated for a cross-section of 52 countries and 5 sectors and regressed on a number of variables affecting the timeliness of delivery. It is found that vertical specialization is sensitive to trade barriers and infrastructure quality and cost of infrastructural services. The relative importance of trade barriers and various indicators of infrastructure vary between sectors. Vertical specialization in the electronics sector appears to be most sensitive to trade barriers and the density of the telecommunication network. This is also the case for the motor vehicles sector, but the size of the parameters is somewhat lower. The chemicals sector is most sensitive to the restriction on maritime services, while for textiles and clothing the aggregated measure of infrastructure had the highest explanatory power. Only in the electronics sector did the wage level (GDP per capita was used as a proxy) matter for vertical specialization.

This paper discusses how information and communication technology (ICT) affects the quality and reach of consumer services. These services need to be provided locally, but consist of several components, some of which can be digitised and transmitted over long distances. A general equilibrium model is developed and numerical simulations in a stylised two-factor, two-region, centre-periphery setting are presented. Trade in intermediate services improves the quality of consumer services enormously in the periphery, but may reduce the quality at the centre. Trade in intermediate services also has a dramatic impact on skilled workers’ wages in the periphery, both relative to unskilled workers in their own region and relative to skilled workers at the centre and leads to a more equal distribution of income both between the centre and the periphery and within the periphery.

The purpose of the paper is to discuss the effects of WTO accession on policy-making and institutional reforms in transition countries. This is done by looking at the experience of those transition countries which are already Members of the WTO. We start by examining the effect of accession on trade policy and distinguish between the effects of accession negotiations and those of autonomous policy initiatives. We find that no precise blueprint of accession conditions can be ascertained, that WTO played a role, albeit not an exclusive one in the process of liberalization, that the costs of WTO Membership are not negligible, that the benefits of WTO Membership are also significant in terms of a better market access, improved governance and a recourse to better economic policies.

Non-transparency is a term given in this paper to a set of government policies that increase the risk and uncertainty faced by economic actors foreign investors. This increase in risk and uncertainty stems from the presence of bribery and corruption, unstable economic policies, weak and poorly enforced property rights, and inefficient government institutions. Our empirical analysis shows that the degree of non-transparency is an important factor in a country's attractiveness to foreign investors. High levels of non-transparency can greatly retard the amount of foreign investment that a country might otherwise expect. The simulation exercise presented in the statistical part of this paper reveals that on average a country could expect 40 percent increase in FDI from a one point increase in their transparency ranking. Pari passu, non-transparent policies translate into lower levels of FDI and hence lower levels of welfare and efficiency in the host country's economy. A nation that takes steps to increase the degree of transparency in its policies and institutions could expect significant increases in the level of foreign investment into their country. This increased investment translates into more resources, which in turn increases social welfare and economic efficiency.

The revolution in the telecommunication industry of recent years raises a number of interesting economic questions with significant policy implications. One of these questions is the extent to which foreign investments in the telecommunication industry is accompanied by policies that are conducive to cross–border investments. These policies can be both domestic and international. The discussion in this paper is limited to the latter by concentrating on the role of the WTO and other international agreements. The purpose of the paper is to evaluate the GATS/Telecom Agreement. This is done by looking at the guiding principles for negotiating market access for foreign investors, by comparing the Agreement with the Telecom Agreement under NAFTA and by discussing the merits of the multilateral approach to negotiating foreign investment in the telecommunication sector. The WTO GATS/Telecom Agreement comes out rather well from this evaluation exercise.