Economic research and trade policy analysis

Commitments in regional trade agreements (RTAs) that fall short of the same countries' obligations under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) are a relatively frequent phenomenon. However, they have gone widely unnoticed in the literature to date and drawn very little attention in relevant WTO fora either. Nevertheless, 'minus commitments' are potentially poisonous and, for various reasons, would deserve close attention. Given the broad definitional scope of the GATS, extending inter alia to commercial presence, such commitments may impinge upon the rights of third-country investors in the RTA economies. Their existence casts doubts on the legal status of the respective agreements under the GATS and can have severe implications for the trading system overall. If not complemented by comprehensive Most-favoured-Nation clauses, the RTAs concerned are disconnected from the WTO and virtually impossible to multilateralize. Based on a review of some 80,000 commitments in 66 agreements, this study seeks to develop a reasonably comprehensive picture of the frequency of 'minus commitments' and their dosage in terms of sectors, measures and modes of supply. It also discusses potential remedies from a WTO perspective.

Policy uncertainty can delay investment and reduce the response to policy change. I provide theoretical and novel quantitative evidence for these effects by focusing on trade policy, a ubiquitous but often overlooked source of uncertainty, when a firm's cost of export market entry is sunk. While an explicit purpose of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is to secure long term market access, little theoretical and empirical work analyzes the value of WTO institutions for reducing uncertainty for prospective exporters. Within a dynamic model of heterogeneous firms, I show that trade policy uncertainty will delay the entry of exporters into new markets and make them less responsive to applied tariff reductions. Policy instruments that reduce or eliminate uncertainty such as binding trade policy commitments at the WTO can increase entry even when applied protection is unchanged. I test the model using a disaggregated and detailed dataset of product level Australian imports in 2004 and 2006. I use the variation in tariffs and binding commitments across countries, products and time, to construct model-consistent measures of uncertainty. The estimates indicate that lower WTO commitments increase entry. Reducing trade policy uncertainty is at least as effective quantitatively as unilateral applied tariff reductions for Australia. These results illuminate and quantify an important new channel for trade creation in the world trade system.

WTO arbitrators rely on economics to establish the permissible retaliation limits authorized by the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) which arguably serves to enforce the overall agreement. We examine how theoretical and quantitative economic analysis has and can be used in this stage of the DSU process. First, we identify, characterize, and categorize the major classes of disputes – e.g., those affecting import protection versus export promotion – and use the Bagwell and Staiger interpretation of the WTO principle of reciprocity to provide a theoretical framework that arbitrators can use to identify the maximum level of retaliatory countermeasures. Second, we allocate each of the ten DSU arbitrations that have taken place thus far into one of these categories and compare the arbitrators’ actual approach with the theory. Third, we use this framework to identify three crucial elements to the arbitrators' decisionmaking process for each case: i) the formula that they decide to adopt for identifying appropriate countermeasures, ii) their political-legal-economic decision on a WTOconsistent counterfactual to use to implement the formula, and iii) the quantitative methods they use to necessarily construct the (unobserved) WTO-consistent counterfactual. We examine not only the arbitrations that have taken place thus far, but our approach also illustrates a template for many additional types of arbitrations likely to take place under the DSU. Finally, in the disputes in which this reciprocity approach has not been used, we identify procedural difficulties that arbitrators confront thus highlighting the constraints that hinder their use of economic analysis in practice.

We estimate the effects of trade facilitation on the extensive margins of trade. Using OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators – which closely reflect the Trade Facilitation Agreement negotiated at the Bali WTO Ministerial Conference of December 2013 – we show that trade facilitation in a given exporting country is positively correlated with the number of products exported by destination and with the number of export destinations served by product. To address the issue of causality, we employ an identification strategy whereby only exports of new products, or exports to new destinations, are taken into account when computing the respective margins of trade. Our findings therefore imply a positive causal impact of trade facilitation on the extensive margins of trade. The results are, to a large extent, robust to alternative definitions of extensive margins, to different sets of controls variables and to various estimation methods. Simulating the effect of an increase to the regional or global median values of trade facilitation, we are able to quantify the potential extensive margin gains of trade facilitation reform in different regions.

Better information on how services policies vary across economies and sectors over time would improve the empirical analysis of their impact. This paper describes the Services Trade Policy Database (STPD), a joint initiative by the World Bank and the WTO Secretariat, which builds on a database developed by the World Bank nearly ten years ago and draws on a recent OECD database.

Bangladesh's international image is not as a popular tourism destination, and many people might be surprised to learn it has three World Heritage sites, including the Sundarbans tiger reserves. Moreover, it is part of important travel circuits for cultural and religious tourism, and has demonstrated potential for sports tourism. The objective of this working paper is to critically test the assertion that pro-poor "green" tourism is one of the best development options for the majority of least developed countries (LDCs) -- a challenging task in Bangladesh in the face of the country's success as an exporter of readymade garments -- by comparing tourism to the available alternatives with regard to the crucial government priorities of export diversification, employment generation and the "green economy". It is well-known that Bangladesh is under strong pressure to diversify its exports, to generate new employment (especially in rural areas), and to respond to critical environmental issues. The government has identified over 30 "thrust sectors" (including tourism) to help address these challenges, but otherwise tourism is rarely mentioned as a major trade and development option for Bangladesh. Within the limitations of data availability, this working paper reaches the conclusion that greater efforts to develop "green" tourism would be highly beneficial for facilitating rural development, environmental and cultural protection, gender equality, and export diversification in services. The most obvious current impediments are inadequate infrastructure, lack of investment and (typically election year) political conflict, but behind these factors appear to be a serious lack of stakeholder coordination, insufficient regulatory and administrative transparency and coherence, as well as some government reluctance to relinquish greater commercial autonomy in tourism to the private sector. This paper offers extensive analysis and some suggestions to help address the impediments, including the recommendation to create a Bangladesh Tourism Stakeholders Forum.

A new information note published by the WTO Secretariat looks at how the COVID-19 pandemic has affected the participation of least-developed countries (LDCs) in global trade. The note stresses that LDCs have seen a significant decline in export earnings due to decreasing demand in key markets, falling commodity prices and a decline in remittances and are likely to be the hardest hit by the crisis due to their limited resources to stimulate growth.

In a rapidly changing trade environment, marked by economic slowdown and impasse in the Doha Round, the success of the WTO in promoting and legitimizing the rules-based multilateral trading system rests, to a large extent, on maintaining effective relations with civil society, including non-governmental organisations. This paper provides an overview of the WTO's rules and practices for transparency and engagement with NGOs. First, it looks at both internal and external transparency. Second, it deals with how the WTO engages with civil society and illustrates how this has evolved over time. Third, it looks at how NGOs and civil society contribute to the dispute settlement process. In concluding, it explores whether there is scope for enhancing the WTO's current practices for engagement with NGOs, and if so how. It also offers some suggestions on how NGOs can render the WTO more accountable to the public. One area in which the WTO's practices for transparency and channels of engagement with civil society actors has evolved considerably is dispute settlement. Although only WTO members can bring a dispute to the WTO, the practice of opening hearings to the public, upon the parties' request, and inviting contributions from non-members, including NGOs, shows to what extent WTO transparency and engagement with civil society have improved in recent times. In particular, NGOs have assisted parties to a dispute prepare their briefs. This has included annexing studies to the parties's submissions, submitting amicus curiae briefs, and supporting the panel as experts under Article 13 of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). Forging links with civil society is a formidable task for any intergovernmental organization; at issue are the rights of governments to set WTO policy and the need to respect the voices of those without a vote. Although the WTO's rules for engagement with civil society based on Article V:2 of the Marrakesh Agreement and further elaborated in the 1996 Guidelines have not been updated, the actual practices for engagement have evolved considerably over time and it is likely that they will continue to be improved upon in the future.

This paper deals with claims, recently raised in various circles, that structural faults in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) have prevented WTO Members from advancing services liberalization under the Agreement. The GATS is generally associated in this context with a bottom-up (positive-list) scheduling approach where the sectors on which trade commitments are undertaken are selected individually. This is claimed to be less efficient, in terms of liberalization effects, than alternative approaches under which everything is considered to be fully committed unless specifically excluded (top-down or negative listing). However, a closer look at services negotiations conducted in various settings, including the Doha-Round process, WTO accession cases and different types of regional trade agreements, suggests that such structural issues have limited, if any, impact on the results achieved. What ultimately matters are not negotiating or scheduling techniques, but the political impetus that the governments concerned are ready to generate.

This paper investigates how RTAs treat disputes concerning their TBT provisions, in particular whether they treat them differently from other types of dispute, and how they deal with any potential overlap with the WTO when the substantive obligations of the RTA and the WTO TBT Agreement are the same (or similar).