Règlement des différends
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India - Tariff Treatment on Certain Goods
Dominican Republic - Anti-dumping measures on corrugated steel bars
China - Anti-Dumping measures on stainless steel products from Japan
Chine - Mesures antidumping visant les produits en acier inoxydable en provenance du Japon
República Dominicana - Medidas antidumping sobre barras de acero corrugadas
Trade Skirmishes and Safeguards
I propose a framework within which to interpret and evaluate the major reforms introduced to the GATT system in its transition to the WTO. In particular I examine the WTO Agreement on Safeguards that has replaced the GATT escape clause (Article XIX) and the Dispute Settlement Process (DSP) that resembles a court of law under the WTO. Using this framework I interpret the weakening of the reciprocity principle under the Agreement on Safeguards as an attempt to reduce efficiency-reducing trade skirmishes. The DSP is interpreted as an impartial arbitrator that announces its opinion about the state of the world when a dispute arises among member countries. I demonstrate that the reforms in the GATT escape clause should be bundled with the introduction of the DSP in order to maintain the incentive-compatibility of trade agreements. The model implies that trade agreements under the WTO lead to fewer trade skirmishes but this effect does not necessarily result in higher payoffs to the governments. The model also implies that the introduction of the WTO court which has no enforcement power can in fact improve the self-enforceability of trade agreements.
Indisputably Essential
Economic theory has made considerable progress in explaining why sovereign countries cooperate in trade. Central to most theories of trade cooperation are issues of self-enforcement: The threat of reprisal by an aggrieved party maintains the initial balance of concessions and prevents opportunism. However economic scholarship has been less coherent in explaining why countries choose to settle and enforce their trade disputes with the help of an impartial third party a “trade court”. Typically economists focusing on the purpose of trade agreements have assumed away the very reasons why institutions are needed since under standard assumptions neither defection from the rules nor disputes are expected to occur. This paper is a step towards the formulation of a coherent economic theory of dispute settlement. It challenges traditional models of enforcement (primarily concerned with acts of punishment) for being insufficient in explaining the existence of dispute settlement institutions. We perform a comprehensive analysis of the economics of dispute settlement institutions and demonstrate to what extent the literatures of trade cooperation and dispute institutions are (and should be) interlinked. On the basis of these theories we show that dispute settlement institutions in trade agreements may assume a variety of roles including that of an information repository and disseminator an honest broker an arbitrator and calculator of damages an active information gatherer or an adjudicator.
How Regional Trade Agreements Deal with Disputes Concerning their TBT Provisions?
This paper investigates how RTAs treat disputes concerning their TBT provisions in particular whether they treat them differently from other types of dispute and how they deal with any potential overlap with the WTO when the substantive obligations of the RTA and the WTO TBT Agreement are the same (or similar).
Political & Quasi-Adjudicative Dispute Settlement Models in European Union Free Trade Agreements
In this paper interpretation and application dispute settlement provisions of European Union (EU) Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) signed between 1963 and 2006 are analysed. This will be through the two models of Dispute Settlement in International Law: the political and adjudicative. Political elements of dispute settlement mechanisms in Public international Law and General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT) served to establish those of the EU FTAs. Adjudicative and quasi-adjudicative elements of dispute settlement mechanisms of Public International Law and World Trade Organization (WTO) Law were used as parameters to set up those of the EU FTAs. These parameters also helped to define a new and unique hybrid model. The features of this model were found in Agreements with trade issues other than FTAs. It is possible however for future FTAs to incorporate them. The hybrid model is based on an adjudicative framework and includes both political and adjudicative elements. In conclusion it was found that even though WTO Members incorporated adjudicative elements in the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) the EU did not incorporate them bilaterally for a further five years. Furthermore since the creation of the DSU in 1995 the EU has established more FTAs based on a political model than on a quasi-adjudicative. Consequently the quasi-adjudicative dispute settlement model has not represented a clear trend in EU FTAs.
The Role of WTO Committees through the Lens of Specific Trade Concerns Raised in the TBT Committee
In this paper we provide some evidence of the common claim that STCs improve transparency and monitoring as well as help mitigate trade conflicts.
Use of the WTO Trade Dispute Settlement Mechanism by the Latin American Countries
The WTO's Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) has been hailed as a fundamental aspect of the Multilateral Trading System for developing countries. At the same time developing countries face many challenges to ensure their effective participation in the mechanism. This paper presents statistical evidence of how Latin-American countries have been very active in their use of the DSM especially when their use of the mechanism is compared to their participation in world trade. This paper also analyses why to a large extent Latin American countries have overcome the challenges of participating in the DSM; and have done so by coming up with innovative and creative solutions without deviating from the guidelines established by WTO rules.
Mapping of Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in Regional Trade Agreements
Regional trade agreements (RTAs) have become an indelible feature of the international trading landscape. Most if not all RTAs contain provisions that establish procedures for resolving disputes among their signatory members. Yet the design and functioning of these dispute settlement mechanisms (DSMs) and more specifically how they differ from the WTO dispute settlement system remain relatively unexplored. Existing academic literature has primarily focused on the narrow issue of jurisdictional conflict between DSMs of RTAs and the WTO dispute settlement system. Literature mapping out and classifying systematically the DSMs of RTAs is more limited. This research paper goes beyond considering the issue of jurisdictional conflict between the multilateral and "regional" regimes. We map out the DSMs in RTAs that have been notified to the WTO and were in force at the end of 2012 and consider a typology of these DSMs based on their nature and design. We also use the data obtained from our mapping exercise in two ways. First we identify trends and patterns of use either regionally or by individual countries of the different types of DSMs in RTAs. Trends are analysed in relation to five key factors: (i) evolution over time (ii) level of economic development (iii) regional characteristics (iv) level of integration (partial scope agreement free trade agreement or customs union) and (v) configuration (bilateral or plurilateral). Second we undertake a "nuts and bolts" analysis of the DSMs of RTAs by examining their approach to various issues in international dispute settlement. Our aim is to draw conclusions about the extent to which the predominant type of DSM in RTAs has features that are different from those of the WTO dispute settlement system.