WTO Working Papers

When looking at the conditions of trade in natural resources the world appears upside down: tariff protection in natural resources sectors is generally lower than for overall merchandise trade, while export restrictions are twice as likely as in other sectors. On the other hand, tariff escalation is significant in natural resources sectors, where materials in their raw state face, on average, lower duties than in their processed form. In this paper, we discuss how export taxes and tariff escalation may be the result of an uncooperative trade policy. Specifically, tariff escalation and export taxes can be "beggar-thy-neighbor" policies because governments may be tempted to use them to alter the relative price of exports to their advantage (terms-of-trade effect) or to expand the domestic processing industry at the expenses of foreign production (production relocation effect). In equilibrium, these policies offset each other in a Prisoners' Dilemma situation, where trade is inefficiently low.

The creation of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), in the Uruguay Round, and its entry into force in 1995 marked a new stage in the history of the multilateral system. It was motivated essentially by the rapid expansion of international services trade within an increasingly open environment in many countries. Given the peculiarities of services trade, including the intangible nature of the products concerned and the need for direct contact between supplier and user in many cases, the Agreement contains a variety of conceptual innovations, including its extension to modes of supply beyond conventional cross-border trade (consumption abroad, commercial presence, and presence of natural persons) and its coverage, and legitimization, of various types of non-tariff restrictions. In turn, the new concepts needed time to be absorbed by the ministries and agencies involved in services trade. Further, the positive-list, or bottom-up, approach to scheduling trade commitments under the GATS meant that great flexibility was given to Members in selecting the sectors concerned and specifying the levels of access provided under individual modes. Thus, not surprisingly, the schedules that emerged from the Uruguay Round, which still account for the majority of current commitments, contain a variety of unclear or superfluous entries that may cause interpretation problems. Their solution could contribute significantly to the clarity and comparability of access obligations across sectors and WTO Members. The scheduling conventions agreed for the Doha Round thus provide specifically for the possibility of technical refinements that leave the substance of commitments unchanged. However, not only was this possibility used more sparingly to date than might have been expected, but additional flaws would be introduced if some current offers were to enter into effect. The following discussion, with a focus on a particular group of entries (market access via commercial presence), tries to explain the scope for such refinements and develop a clearer picture of the areas where further action might be needed.

We propose a theoretical framework for analyzing the problems associated to unilateral immigration policy in receiving countries and for evaluating the grounds for reform of international institutions governing immigration. We build a model with multiple destination countries and show that immigration policy in one country is influenced by measures adopted abroad as migrants choose where to locate (in part) in response to differences in immigration policy. This interdependence gives rise to a leakage effect of immigration policy, an international externality well documented in the empirical literature. In this environment, immigration policy becomes strategic and unilateral behavior may lead to coordination failures, where receiving countries are stuck in welfare inferior equilibria. We then study the conditions under which a coordination failure is more likely to emerge and argue that multilateral institutions that help receiving countries make immigration policy commitments would address this inefficiency.

The Trade Policy Reviews conducted in the Western Hemisphere over 1989-2009 contain a wealth of information that puts in clear evidence the considerable improvements achieved in most American countries during the first two decades of operation of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism. Those Reviews show that trade liberalization came hand-in-hand with internal reforms, and was generally of an autonomous nature and an intrinsic component of improved economic management. Trade liberalization slowed down during the second decade under review, with tariffs having come down mostly during the earlier years. The use of non-tariff barriers also fell over time although at a slow pace in some of the smallest Members, which found it difficult to implement the more complex trade policy instrument applied by larger countries. Export and other government assistance schemes proliferated throughout the continent but were often characterized by a lack of unity in the criteria used to assign and apply them. The review period also witnessed enormous changes in the services sectors, where reforms usually proved more complex than in the goods area. The multilateral and other international trade agreements contributed to the stability of trade policies and the general rejection of protectionism, although backtracking did occur in a number of cases. Because the commitments made during the Uruguay Round negotiation now fall short of the more liberal trade regimes that came to be over the review period, most Members in the Americas could presently raise trade and investment barriers without violating multilateral rules. Thus, the pressing need to conclude the Doha Development Agenda in order to lock in the considerable trade policy liberalization achieved during past years, and to strengthen the multilateral trading system.

The previous literature provides a highly ambiguous picture on the impact of trade and investment agreements on FDI. Most empirical studies ignore the actual content of BITs and RTAs, treating them as "black boxes", despite the diversity of investment provisions constituting the essence of these agreements. We overcome this serious limitation by analyzing the impact of modalities on the admission of FDI and dispute settlement mechanisms in both RTAs and BITs on bilateral FDI flows between 1978 and 2004. We find that FDI reacts positively to RTAs only if they offer liberal admission rules. Dispute settlement provisions play a minor role. While RTAs without strong investment provisions may even discourage FDI, the reactions to BITs are less discriminate with foreign investors responding favourably to the mere existence of BITs.

In spite of their growing importance in international trade as well as in bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations, services have only attracted limited attention from researchers interested in determinants of trade policies and trade cooperation. This paper seeks to account for countries' varying levels of market access commitments under the multilateral General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). I develop an argument suggesting how levels of democracy and factor endowments are associated with more commitments. The empirical analysis supports these propositions, and also suggests that relative size, as well as regulatory capacity, are positively linked to GATS commitments.

The paper discusses a number of issues related to the treatment of trade credit internationally, a priori (treatment by banking regulators) and a posteriori (treatment by debtors and creditors in the case of default), which are currently of interest to the trade finance community, in particular the traditional providers of trade credit and guarantees, such as banks, export credit agencies, regional development banks, and multilateral agencies. The paper does not deal with the specific issue of regulation of official insured-export credit, under the OECD Arrangement, which is a specific matter left out of this analysis. Traditionally, trade finance has received preferred treatment on the part of national and international regulators, as well as by international financial agencies in the treatment of trade finance claims, on grounds that trade finance was one of the safest, most collateralized, and selfliquidating forms of trade finance. Preferred treatment of trade finance also reflects the systemic importance of trade, as in sovereign or private defaults a priority is to "treat" expeditiously trade lines of credits to allow for such credit to be restored and trade to flow again. It is not only a matter of urgency for essential imports to be financed, but also a pre-condition for economic recovery, as the resumption of trade is necessary for ailing countries to restore balance of payments equilibrium. The relatively favourable treatment received by trade finance was reflected in the moderate rate of capitalization for cross-border trade credit in the form of letters of credit and similar securitized instruments under the Basel I regulatory framework, put in place in the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, as the banking and regulatory communities moved towards internal-rating based and risk-weighted assets systems under the successor Basel II framework, a number of complaints emerged with respect to the treatment of trade credit – particularly in periods of crisis. Issues of pro-cyclicality, maturity structure and country risk have been discussed at some length in various fora, including in the WTO at the initiative of Members. Part of the issue was that Basel II regulation was designed and implemented in a manner that, in periods of banking retrenchment, seemed to have affected the supply of trade credit more than other potentially more risky forms of lending. With the collapse of trade in late 2008 and early 2009, the regulatory treatment of trade credit under Basel II clearly became an issue and was discussed by professional banking organizations, regulators and international financial institutions. A sentence made its headway into the communiqué of G-20 Leaders in London in April 2009, calling upon regulators to exercise some flexibility in the application of Basel II rules, in support of trade finance. As the issue of removing the obstacles to the supply of trade finance spread became part of the public debate, discussions with respect to the regulatory treatment of trade finance in the context of the making of "Basel III" rules are now raising political attention. Part of the underlying problem regarding the design of regulation of trade finance is that banking regulators may not have enough understanding of the way that trade and trade finance operate in practice. In turn, the banking community has made insufficient progress in explaining these issues to regulators and in providing evidence about the high level of safety and soundness of their activity, in collecting statistical information and even in defining clearly what comprises trade finance. This paper aims at clarifying such issues. The WTO, in its role as an "honest broker", is trying to help the parties concerned, and has been asked from time to time to act as a go-between between the two communities, in order to clarify issues. Section 1 looks at the overall Basel framework and its evolution over time, with particular emphasis on the regulation of trade finance. Section 2 looks at issues raised in the WTO context by the trading and trade finance communities, be it by WTO Members or by experts, and how this has helped to clarify some of the disputed issues. Section 3 raises a number of questions which need clarification from the trade finance community for regulators to be able to better capture the reality of trade finance operations, and allow them to regulate with full understanding of its implications.

We examine the effects of transit, documentation, and ports and customs delays on Africa’s exports. We find that transit delays have the most economically and statically significant effect on exports. A one day reduction in inland travel times leads to a 7 percent increase in exports. Put another way, a one day reduction in inland travel times translates into 1.5 percentage point decrease in all importing-country tariffs. In contrast, longer delays in the other areas have a far smaller impact on trade. We control for the possibility that greater trade leads to shorter delays in three ways. First, we examine the effect of trade times on exports of new products. Second, we evaluate the effect of delays in a transit country on the exports of landlocked countries. Third, we examine whether delays affect time-sensitive goods relatively more. We show that large transit delays are relatively more harmful because of high within-country variation.

It is becoming increasingly important to put freshwater issues in a global context. Local water depletion and pollution are often closely tied to the structure of the global economy. With increasing trade between nations and continents, water is more frequently used to produce exported goods. International trade in commodities implies long-distance transfers of water in virtual form, where virtual water is understood as the volume of water that has been used to produce a commodity and that is thus virtually embedded in it. Knowledge about the virtual-water flows entering and leaving a country can cast a completely new light on the actual water scarcity of a country. For example, Jordan imports about 5 to 7 billion m3 of virtual water per year, which is in sharp contrast with the 1 billion m3 of water withdrawn annually from domestic water sources. This means that people in Jordan apparently survive owing to the import of water-intensive commodities from elsewhere, for example the USA.

In this report we first give a brief overview of trade in seafood and seafood production. We then review the basic bioeconomic theory of the fishery and pinpoint why fisheries are different from most other industries. We next review the theoretical literature on trade and renewable resources that shows how unconventional outcomes from trade liberalization can emerge. Given this background, we discuss the most important policy issues in relation to seafood and trade, including sections on managing the global commons and domestic trends in management. In the final section, we discuss specific issues that are germane to the WTO and its rules.