Anti-dumping, subsidies, safeguards

On 30 November 2020 the WTO circulated the panel report in the case brought by Japan in “Korea - Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties on Stainless Steel Bars” (DS553).

On 24 August 2020 the WTO circulated the dispute panel report in the case brought by Canada in “United States - Countervailing Measures on Softwood Lumber from Canada” (DS533).

On 16 June 2020 the WTO circulated the panel report in the case brought by Qatar in “Saudi Arabia — Measures concerning the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights” (DS567).

On 10 December 2019 the Appellate Body issued its report in the case brought by Turkey in “Morocco - Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot Rolled Steel from Turkey” (DS513). On 4 December Morocco notified the Appellate Body that it had withdrawn its appeal in this dispute.

On 2 December 2019 the WTO circulated the compliance panel report in the case brought by the European Union in “European Communities and Certain Member States - Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft - Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the EU” (DS316)

On 1 November 2019 a WTO arbitrator issued its decision on the level of countermeasures China may request with respect to the United States in “United States - Certain Methodologies and their Application to Anti-Dumping Proceedings Involving China” (DS471).

On 12 July 2019 the WTO circulated the panel report in the compliance case initiated by the Philippines in “Thailand — Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from the Philippines — Second Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the Philippines” (DS371).

On 11 July 2019 the WTO circulated two panel report in the cases brought by Canada and Mexico in “United States — Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium Products” (DS550) and “United States — Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium Products” (DS551).

Guided by a cost benefit analysis model and using a unique database of tariff bindings for all WTO countries over the 1996-2011 period we show that WTO commitments affect members’ trade policy. More stringent bindings reduce the likelihood of responding to import shocks by raising tariffs and increase the likelihood of contingent measures. We argue that this reduces overall trade policy uncertainty. In a counterfactual scenario where WTO members can arbitrarily increase tariffs they are 4.5 times more likely to do so than under current bindings.

On 28 March 2019 the WTO’s Appellate Body issued its report on US compliance in the dispute brought by the European Union in “United States — Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft — Second complaint” (DS353).