Economic research and trade policy analysis

The WTO Secretariat has published an information note looking at how micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) are being affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. It notes the impact of supply chain disruptions on MSMEs and the extent to which smaller businesses are represented in the economic sectors hardest hit by the crisis.

While greater focus has been cast on analysis of policy changes affecting trade in goods in the aftermath of the financial crisis, little is known about the direction of policies affecting trade in services. On the basis of information contained in the I-TIP Services database, this paper provides an overview of the evolution of services trade policies since 2000, where policy changes – whether towards more liberalization or more protection – tend to be less easily reversible and to have a greater impact. Has protectionism increased in the aftermath of the crisis? Which countries, sectors and modes of supply have been associated with most trade facilitating and trade-restrictive measures? The evidence gathered contradicts in many respects basic political economy expectations. Indeed, the countries, sectors and modes of supply where liberalizing and protectionist measures have been implemented are not necessarily those one would have assumed. Most importantly, trade-facilitating measures have clearly outweighed trade-restrictive ones over the recent period, including after the onset of the crisis. This strong push towards autonomous liberalization bodes well for trade negotiations on trade in services. The undertaking of greater commitments would bring benefits by consolidating this recent liberalization and by helping to reduce non-negligible outbursts of protectionism that have been witnessed over the last years. However, bilateral and plurilateral agreements, because of their limited country coverage, would only capture a fraction of the recent autonomous liberalization and, similarly, only help prevent part of the protectionist measures springing up.

With international trade moving from "trade in (final) goods" to "trade in tasks", effective protection rates (EPRs) are back to the stage, allowing us to measure the overall protection of a product or sector by including the production structure and the origin of the inputs -domestic or imported. Input-output matrices are used in this paper to monitor the production structure of 10 Asian-Pacific countries between 1995 and 2005, and to calculate sectorial EPRs. The paper proposes a series of counter-factual simulation methods aimed at isolating the specific contribution of changes in tariff policies, in production structure or in real exchange rates. Working on international input output matrices allowed also to compute and compare the average propagation length of a cost-push linked to a sudden change in tariff duties, identifying those sectors that are the most deeply interconnected, both in the intensity and in the length of their inter-industrial foreign relationships.

The paper discusses the experience to date with the implementation and application of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), some ten years after its entry into force. One striking observation is the smooth functioning of the Agreement, which has created far less tensions and frictions, including at Ministerial Meetings, than its difficult negotiating history might have suggested. This is due in large part to a high degree of flexibility at several levels: Members have more scope than under the GATT to depart from common horizontal obligations, in particular the MFN principle; they are able to adjust the breadth and depth of their trade commitments (market access and national treatment) to particular sector conditions; and they face less constraints, if any, in the use of trade-related policies such as subsidies, export restrictions, or domestic regulatory interventions. An additional source of flexibility is the uncertainty still surrounding a few core concepts of the Agreement and their sometimes daring application in individual schedules. While the ongoing negotiations also provide an opportunity for technical corrections of scheduling problems, the basic (built-in) flexibility elements of the Agreement - including the bottom-up approach of undertaking sector commitments and the possibility of inscribing limitations under individual modes - will, of course, persist. (Their actual relevance may, nevertheless, differ significantly between 'old' Members and countries negotiating their accession to the WTO.) Given the broad reach of of the Agreement in terms of membership, sector application, and modal coverage, flexibility may be considered a conditio sine qua non. There is little reason to believe that a more rigid structure would have been acceptable to Uruguay Round participants and, even if so, that it would have proven stable and resilient over time. However, flexibility may come at a cost: lack of meaningful obligations across a reasonably broad range of service sectors. Vested interests may find it far easier than under the GATT to defend their privileges and defy more rational and harmonized trading conditions. While the paper discusses formula-based approaches that have been proposed to improve the quantity and/or quality of sector commitments within the existing framework of GATS, there should be no illusion about the scope for technical solutions to what constitutes a political and institutional challenge.

The frequency, severity and economic impact of natural disasters are growing. Import surges resulting from disaster-response efforts can highlight underlying structural failings in the border clearance regimes of disaster-affected countries.

The process leading to WTO accession is complex, requires solid domestic coordination mechanisms in the acceding country, a rethinking of its economic and trade policies and significant domestic structural reforms. It often implies the creation of new institutions designed to coordinate and implement the policies at the national level, as was the case in Georgia.

As governments increasingly adopt policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, concern has grown on two fronts. First, carbon leakage can occur when mitigation policies are not the same across countries and producers seek to locate in jurisdictions where production costs are least affected by emission constraints. The risk of carbon leakage raises questions about the efficacy of climate change policies in a global sense. Secondly, it is precisely the cost-related consequences of differential mitigation policies that feed industry concerns about competitiveness. We thus have a link between environmental and competitiveness perspectives that fuses climate change and trade regimes in potentially problematic ways as governments contemplate trade actions to manage the environmental and/or competitiveness consequences of differential climate change policies. On the trade side of this relationship, we have the reality that the GATT/WTO rules were not originally drafted to accommodate climate change policies and concerns. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relevance of certain WTO rules to the interface between climate change and trade, focusing in particular on border measures, technical regulations on trade, standards and labelling, and subsidies and countervailing duties. It concludes that in the absence of clear international understandings on how to manage the climate change and trade interface, we run the risk of a clash that compromises the effectiveness of climate change policies as well as the potential gains from specialization through trade.

This paper explores the impact of vertical specialization on world trade within the framework of the O-ring theory of production. Within such a framework there is little scope for substituting quantity for quality or for gaining market shares by undercutting established suppliers purely on cost. Furthermore, quality requirements will increase as lead firms in the supply chain invest in technology that reduces inventory and speeds up the production process. It is shown that potential suppliers in low-cost countries will only have an incentive to upgrade quality if adequately efficient infrastructure, logistics and customs procedures are in place. Changing trade patterns between USA and Mexico and China suggests that proximity and low trade barriers are important determinants of the extent and nature of vertical specialization. Thus, a larger share of Mexico's trade with USA is driven by vertical specialization than China's trade with USA. Nevertheless, China has caught up with Mexico as far as share in US total imports is concerned, and the market share gap has narrowed even in electronics, the sector in which vertical specialization is most prominent. It appears that vertical specialization adds to total world trade rather than replacing traditional trade flows.

This paper examines the evolution of national competition (antitrust) policies and enforcement approaches vis-à-vis intellectual property rights (IPRs) and associated anti-competitive practices in major jurisdictions over the past several decades. It focuses especially on the underlying process of economic learning that has, the authors suggest, driven relevant policy changes.

For trade in goods and services to flow, traders and governments need to know the rules. At no time is this more critical than at moments of crisis such as the COVID-19 pandemic. New trade measures are being taken by governments every day in response to COVID-19. If the different actors engaged in supply chains are not aware of these new requirements, they can struggle to adapt to the new conditions, thereby risking unnecessary disruptions. Transparency is precisely about allowing access to this information and more. It enables governments and traders to keep up to date in a rapidly evolving trade landscape and provides.