About the WTO

In 2003, the WTO General Council decided to provide an additional legal pathway for WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector to access medicines. Two years later, in 2005, WTO Members unanimously agreed to give this mechanism, often referred to as the "Paragraph 6 System", a permanent legal status when they adopted the Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement. The implementation and use of the additional pro-public health flexibilities provided by the System is optional, not mandatory. To take advantage of them, as of July 2015, 51 WTO Members have adopted specific implementing measures with a variable degree of detail and complexity which incorporate the Paragraph 6 System in their respective legal frameworks and provide the basis for them to act either as exporter or as importers, or as both. This represents almost a third of the WTO Membership, and the predominant bulk of existing pharmaceutical exporters. Given that, unlike other flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement, the Paragraph 6 System was devised as a new mechanism without previous domestic experience to draw upon, there seems to be an exceptional need for an in-depth discussion of how it has been implemented at country level to which this paper attempts to respond. There is, indeed, often limited knowledge in the policy and procurement communities about the wide range of specific measures that have been introduced in many major exporters of medicines and the importance of this information both from a practical point of view, to facilitate exports of needed medicines, and from a policy point of view, to understand the implementation of this novel tool for access to medicines. To contribute to a better understanding of how the System has been implemented in practice, this paper surveys domestic measures that WTO Members have put in place. By doing so, it can inform the broader dialogue about access to medicines and provide practical information for procurement programmes. It can also put a valuable source of information and inspiration at the disposal of those Members who are yet in the process of considering whether and how best to implement the Paragraph 6 System in their domestic legal framework. While the survey illustrates that a robust framework supportive of the export of generic medicines to meet public health needs has been put in place by a significant number of WTO Members, there is an obvious need to move a step forward and engage in a substantive review of the System, including if and how better, more frequent use could be made of it. To conclude, the paper therefore offers some elements for reflection regarding the way forward in order to support the functioning of the Paragraph 6 System.

The gains from trade depend on the reallocation of resources, including labour, across firms and sectors. However, workers are unlikely to be fully mobile since there are barriers to sectoral and geographical mobility due to social reasons such as family or existing private and professional networks. If these barriers depend on specific characteristics of workers, such as education, gender or race, this has important implications for inequality.

Natural resources account for 20% of world trade, and dominate the exports of many countries. Policy is used to manipulate both international and domestic prices of resources, yet this policy is largely outside the disciplines of the WTO. The instruments used include export taxes, price controls, production quotas, and domestic producer and consumer taxes (equivalent to trade taxes if no domestic production is possible). We review the literature, and argue that the policy equilibrium is inefficient. This inefficiency is exacerbated by market failure in long run contracts for exploration and development of natural resources. Properly coordinated policy reforms offer an avenue to resource exporting and importing countries to overcome these inefficiencies and obtain mutual gains.

Without transparency, trade agreements are just words on paper. Transparency as disclosure allows economic actors and trading partners to see how rules are implanted; transparency in decision-making ensures fairness and peer review. In the first section of this paper, I discuss the logic of transparency in general and the motivation for its use in the trading system. Considerable information on WTO transparency mechanisms is available in the Minutes and annual reports of the various WTO bodies, and in the Director-General’s annual overview of the trading system, but comparative analysis is not easy. In the second section, therefore, I develop a framework in which different transparency mechanisms can be compared to each other using the metaphor of three generations in the evolution of transparency in the trading system as a means of explaining how transparency works in the WTO. For sunshine to work, at least two things must happen. Information must be made available, and Members have to use it. Probing the extent to which Members comply with their notification obligations, in the third section, and their efforts to improve the notification process, allow an assessment of their commitment to being transparent. In the fourth section I consider how WTO committees are used to ensure that Members are accountable for their commitments, including to notify. Since the committees differ, I use the metaphor of the great pyramid of the legal order to compare committees to each other. Assessment of whether these mechanisms work underpins observations in the conclusion on whether more sunshine is needed, and efforts underway to improve existing mechanisms.

Most specific trade concerns (STCs), which are raised before the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Committee), disappear from the TBT Committee’s meeting agendas without escalating into formal disputes. At the same time, a relatively small number of TBT-related disputes have been subject to the WTO dispute settlement procedures. By examining the practice of raising STCs and the relationship between STCs and disputes, the paper emphasises the role of STCs as a trade tension resolution mechanism.

In the last ten years, there has been a sea change in trade and related policies in emerging markets. This results from autonomous reforms undertaken in conjunction with macroeconomic stabilization programmes. Many non-tariff measures have been eliminated and tariffs, now the principal trade instrument, have been rationalized and reduced. Considerable increases in security of market access result from increased membership of the GATT/WTO system, which itself underwent important changes as a result of the Uruguay Round, further developed in the first Ministerial Meeting of the WTO in Singapore in December 1996. The systemic changes and the expansion of WTO membership to the transition and other economies mark a dramatic change in international economic relations.

The concept of "like services and service suppliers" used in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) is still very much uncharted territory. The few dispute cases involving national treatment and most-favoured-nation treatment claims under the GATS are vague concerning the criteria which should be used to establish "likeness". Discussions among WTO Members on this subject have remained limited and inconclusive. Perhaps the only point on which everybody agrees is that a determination of "likeness" under the GATS gives rise to a wider range of questions – and uncertainties – than under the GATT. The intangibility of services, the difficulty to draw a line between product and production, the existence of four modes of supply, the combined reference to like services and like service suppliers, and the lack of a detailed nomenclature are some of the factors which complicate the task of establishing "likeness" in services trade. This contribution focuses on the concept of “likeness” in the context of the national treatment obligation (Article XVII of the GATS). It discusses the possible implications of the combined reference to “like services and service suppliers”, as well as the relevance and role of the modes of supply in determining “likeness”. It also examines whether the criteria developed by GATT case-law (physical properties, classification, end-use and consumer tastes) can be mechanically transposed to services trade and how far they may contribute to establishing “likeness” under the GATS. It then discusses whether other parameters, such as the regulatory context or an “aim and effect” type approach could be relevant.

Compared to its counterpart in merchandise trade, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1947, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) contains a variety of conceptual innovations. In addition to cross-border supply, the Agreement covers three additional types of transactions, i.e. the supply of services via consumer movements abroad as well as the presence of foreign firms and foreign service professionals in the respective markets. At the same time, the GATS accommodates a range of measures, including the use of quantitative restrictions and discriminatory taxes or subsidies, which are clearly constrained under the GATT. The Agreement offers particularly broad scope for various types of export-related interventions, regardless of ensuing market distortions. The social and economic relevance of such measures is immediately evident. This paper seeks to provide an overview and assessment in the light of relevant GATS provisions and WTO dispute rulings.

Trade finance, particularly in the form of short-term, self-liquidating letters of credit and the like, has received relatively favourable treatment regarding capital adequacy and liquidity under Basel III, the new international prudential framework. However, concerns have been expressed over the potential” unintended consequences” of applying the newly created leverage ratio to these instruments, notably for developing countries’ trade. This paper offers a relatively simple model approach showing the conditions under which the initially proposed 100% leverage tax on non-leveraged activities such as letters of credit would reduce their natural attractiveness relative to higher-risk, less collateralized assets, which may stand in the balance sheet of banks. Under these conditions, the model shows that leverage ratio may nullify in part the effect of the low capital ratio that is commensurate to the low risk of such instruments. The decision by the Basel committee on 12 January 2014 to reduce the leverage ratio seems to be justified by the analytical framework developed in this paper.

This paper reviews the different types of provisions explicitly addressing small and medium enterprises (SMEs), including micro firms (MSMEs), in regional trade agreements (RTAs). The analysis covers the 270 RTAs currently in force and notified to the WTO as of April 2016. The analysis shows that half of all the notified RTAs, namely 136 agreements, incorporate at least one provision mentioning explicitly SMEs. These SMEs-related provisions are highly heterogeneous and differ in terms of location in the RTA, language, scope and commitments. Many of the SMEs related provisions are only found in a single or couple of RTAs. A limited but increasing number of RTAs incorporate specific provisions in dedicated articles or even chapters on SMEs. Although the number of detailed SMEs-related provisions included in a given RTA has tended to increase in recent years, most SMEs-related provisions remain couched in best endeavour language. The two most common categories of SMEs-related provisions found in RTAs are provisions (1) promoting cooperation on SMEs and (2) specifying that SMEs and/or programs supporting SMEs are not covered by the RTAs' obligations provisions. Other types of SMEs-related provisions, incorporated in a limited number of RTAs, refer, inter alia, to government procurement, trade facilitation, electronic commerce, intellectual property, or transparency.