About the WTO

In the last ten years, there has been a sea change in trade and related policies in emerging markets. This results from autonomous reforms undertaken in conjunction with macroeconomic stabilization programmes. Many non-tariff measures have been eliminated and tariffs, now the principal trade instrument, have been rationalized and reduced. Considerable increases in security of market access result from increased membership of the GATT/WTO system, which itself underwent important changes as a result of the Uruguay Round, further developed in the first Ministerial Meeting of the WTO in Singapore in December 1996. The systemic changes and the expansion of WTO membership to the transition and other economies mark a dramatic change in international economic relations.

The concept of "like services and service suppliers" used in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) is still very much uncharted territory. The few dispute cases involving national treatment and most-favoured-nation treatment claims under the GATS are vague concerning the criteria which should be used to establish "likeness". Discussions among WTO Members on this subject have remained limited and inconclusive. Perhaps the only point on which everybody agrees is that a determination of "likeness" under the GATS gives rise to a wider range of questions – and uncertainties – than under the GATT. The intangibility of services, the difficulty to draw a line between product and production, the existence of four modes of supply, the combined reference to like services and like service suppliers, and the lack of a detailed nomenclature are some of the factors which complicate the task of establishing "likeness" in services trade. This contribution focuses on the concept of “likeness” in the context of the national treatment obligation (Article XVII of the GATS). It discusses the possible implications of the combined reference to “like services and service suppliers”, as well as the relevance and role of the modes of supply in determining “likeness”. It also examines whether the criteria developed by GATT case-law (physical properties, classification, end-use and consumer tastes) can be mechanically transposed to services trade and how far they may contribute to establishing “likeness” under the GATS. It then discusses whether other parameters, such as the regulatory context or an “aim and effect” type approach could be relevant.

Compared to its counterpart in merchandise trade, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1947, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) contains a variety of conceptual innovations. In addition to cross-border supply, the Agreement covers three additional types of transactions, i.e. the supply of services via consumer movements abroad as well as the presence of foreign firms and foreign service professionals in the respective markets. At the same time, the GATS accommodates a range of measures, including the use of quantitative restrictions and discriminatory taxes or subsidies, which are clearly constrained under the GATT. The Agreement offers particularly broad scope for various types of export-related interventions, regardless of ensuing market distortions. The social and economic relevance of such measures is immediately evident. This paper seeks to provide an overview and assessment in the light of relevant GATS provisions and WTO dispute rulings.

Trade finance, particularly in the form of short-term, self-liquidating letters of credit and the like, has received relatively favourable treatment regarding capital adequacy and liquidity under Basel III, the new international prudential framework. However, concerns have been expressed over the potential” unintended consequences” of applying the newly created leverage ratio to these instruments, notably for developing countries’ trade. This paper offers a relatively simple model approach showing the conditions under which the initially proposed 100% leverage tax on non-leveraged activities such as letters of credit would reduce their natural attractiveness relative to higher-risk, less collateralized assets, which may stand in the balance sheet of banks. Under these conditions, the model shows that leverage ratio may nullify in part the effect of the low capital ratio that is commensurate to the low risk of such instruments. The decision by the Basel committee on 12 January 2014 to reduce the leverage ratio seems to be justified by the analytical framework developed in this paper.

This paper reviews the different types of provisions explicitly addressing small and medium enterprises (SMEs), including micro firms (MSMEs), in regional trade agreements (RTAs). The analysis covers the 270 RTAs currently in force and notified to the WTO as of April 2016. The analysis shows that half of all the notified RTAs, namely 136 agreements, incorporate at least one provision mentioning explicitly SMEs. These SMEs-related provisions are highly heterogeneous and differ in terms of location in the RTA, language, scope and commitments. Many of the SMEs related provisions are only found in a single or couple of RTAs. A limited but increasing number of RTAs incorporate specific provisions in dedicated articles or even chapters on SMEs. Although the number of detailed SMEs-related provisions included in a given RTA has tended to increase in recent years, most SMEs-related provisions remain couched in best endeavour language. The two most common categories of SMEs-related provisions found in RTAs are provisions (1) promoting cooperation on SMEs and (2) specifying that SMEs and/or programs supporting SMEs are not covered by the RTAs' obligations provisions. Other types of SMEs-related provisions, incorporated in a limited number of RTAs, refer, inter alia, to government procurement, trade facilitation, electronic commerce, intellectual property, or transparency.

Since the recovery from the great financial crisis in 2010, global real trade flows grew much slower than pre-crisis, in both absolute terms (growth rates) and relative terms (relative to GDP, from 2:1 in the great 1990's to 1:1 since 2012) A debate has arisen as to whether this global trade slowdown, and related falling trade-to-income elasticity, was structural or cyclical.

In most of the current literature, the spread of regionalism in international trade relations is iscussed in terms of a rapidly rising number of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). Far less attention is given to the even more rapid proliferation of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and their overlap with obligations assumed by WTO Members under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). About 60 per cent of world foreign investment stocks are in services and, thus, covered by mode 3 (commercial presence) of the GATS. A closer look reveals that BITs generally apply across a far wider range of sectors, in particular in the case of LDCs and developing countries, than those scheduled under the GATS. Furthermore, a number of obligations enshrined in BITs go beyond their potential counterparts under the GATS. At the same time, since most WTO Members have not listed relevant exemptions from the Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) clause of the Agreement, their BIT obligations are to be applied on an MFN basis. While this extension may not cause problems in many cases, given generally liberal investment regimes and the focus of most treaties on protecting rather than liberalizing access, inconsistencies remain between the two frameworks. Based on an assessment of relevant provisions, this article discusses options on how WTO Members could proceed.

This paper illustrates how the work of the WTO's standing committees is fuelling regulatory cooperation between WTO members, and inspiring RTA negotiators.

The average international trade transaction is subject to numerous procedural and documentation requirements, which add to the costs of doing business as an importer or exporter and also use up scarce government resources. While these requirements can be necessary to fulfil policy objectives, questions are often raised about why and how they are implemented. The Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA), adopted by WTO Members in 2014, seeks to expedite the movement, release and clearance of goods across borders and reduce these trade transaction costs - by an average of 14.3 per cent as estimated by the 2015 World Trade Report. At the same time, many WTO Agreements already contain provisions aimed at facilitating trade procedures and avoiding unnecessary costs. The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (the TBT Agreement) is one of these: its provisions on transparency and conformity assessment procedures, some of which are applied at the border, are of particular relevance in this context. The TFA and TBT Agreements are in fact complementary, with the TFA introducing some new requirements/recommendations, which are likely to apply to certain TBT measures. This paper maps out the linkages between these two Agreements. It does so with a view to informing TBT officials of the requirements and best practices emerging in the trade facilitation area as well as raising awareness amongst trade/customs officials of existing rules and evolving practices in the TBT area. The 2015 World Trade Report refers to “border agency cooperation” as the main TFA implementation challenge identified by developing countries and also points to the importance of cooperation and coordination between ministries as one of the main success factors. Considering that a significant share of import/export procedures and controls arise from the implementation of TBT measures, a better understanding of the linkages between the TFA and the TBT Agreement (as well as other relevant WTO Agreements such as the SPS Agreement) will be crucial for effective implementation. It will also contribute to more streamlined technical assistance activities and raise awareness among TBT officials of the opportunities generated by trade facilitation projects. The procedures and practices of the WTO TBT Committee, especially with regards to transparency and specific trade concerns, could also be of interest to the future TFA Committee, as it embarks on its task of furthering the implementation of the TFA. All these in turn will help reap the expected benefits of the new Trade Facilitation Agreement.

This paper considers the asymmetric effect of Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) policies on heterogeneous exporters, based on matching a detailed panel of French firm exports to a new database of Trade Facilitation Indicators (TFIs) released recently by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). We analyze the effect of these TFIs on three trade-related outcomes: (i) exported value (firm intensive margin), (ii) number of products exported (product extensive margin) and (iii) average export value per product exported (product intensive margin). We find strong evidence of a heterogeneous effect of trade facilitation across firm size. While better information availability, advance ruling and appeal procedures mainly benefit small firms, the simplification of documents and automation tend to favor large firms’ trade. This is coherent with the idea that while some elements of the TFA simply reduce the fixed cost of exporting (favoring small firms in particular), other chapters in the TFA reduce the scope for corruption at borders, making large firms less reluctant to serve corrupt countries.