Acerca de la OMC

El grupo especial de solución de diferencias de la OMC publicó el 6 de julio de 2017 un informe sobre el asunto “Unión Europea — Medidas compensatorias sobre determinado tereftalato de polietileno procedente del Pakistán” (DS486)

On 8 February 2022, the WTO circulated the panel report in the case brought by the Republic of Korea in “United States — Safeguard measure on imports of large residential washers” (DS546).

On 14 December 2021 the WTO circulated the panel reports in the cases brought by Brazil, Australia and Guatemala in “ India — Measures Concerning Sugar and Sugarcane” (DS579, DS580, DS581).

On 14 December 2021 the WTO circulated the panel reports in the cases brought by Brazil, Australia and Guatemala in “ India — Measures Concerning Sugar and Sugarcane” (DS579, DS580, DS581).

Le 14 décembre 2021, l’OMC a distribué les rapports du Groupe spécial dans l’affaire portée devant l’Organe de règlement des différends par le Brésil, l’Australie et le Guatemala “Inde — Mesures concernant le sucre et la canne à sucre” (DS579, DS580, DS581).

Le 25 juillet 2022, la décision rendue par les arbitres à l’issue de l’examen de certaines constatations du Groupe spécial de l’OMC chargé du différend “Turquie — Certaines mesures concernant la Production, l’importation et la commercialisation de produits pharmaceutiques” (DS583) a été distribuée aux Membres de l’OMC. Les trois arbitres avaient été désignés par l’Union européenne et la Türkiye conformément à l’article 25 du Mémorandum d’accord sur le règlement des différends de l’OMC (Mémorandum d’accord). Le 25 juillet 2022, la décision rendue par les arbitres à l’issue de l’examen de certaines constatations du Groupe spécial de l’OMC chargé du différend “Turquie — Certaines mesures concernant la Production, l’importation et la commercialisation de produits pharmaceutiques” (DS583) a été distribuée aux Membres de l’OMC. Les trois arbitres avaient été désignés par l’Union européenne et la Türkiye conformément à l’article 25 du Mémorandum d’accord sur le règlement des différends de l’OMC (Mémorandum d’accord).

Le 26 janvier 2022, un arbitre de l’OMC a rendu une décision sur le niveau de contre-mesures que la Chine peut demander dans son différend avec les États-Unis concernant les droits compensateurs imposés par ces derniers sur certains produits en provenance de Chine (DS437). Le 26 janvier, un arbitre de l’OMC a rendu une décision sur le niveau de contre-mesures que la Chine peut demander dans son différend avec les États-Unis concernant les droits compensateurs imposés par ces derniers sur certains produits en provenance de Chine (DS437).

Le 13 juillet 2022, un arbitre de l’OMC a rendu sa décision sur la méthode que le Canada peut utiliser pour fixer le niveau de la suspension de concessions ou d’autres obligations dans le secteur des marchandises vis-à-vis des États-Unis si, à l’avenir, ces derniers appliquent des droits compensateurs à des marchandises canadiennes sur la base d’une mesure jugée incompatible avec les règles de l’Organisation. Cette décision découle de la procédure de règlement des différends dans l’affaire “États-Unis — Mesures compensatoires visant le papier supercalandré en provenance du Canada” (DS505). Le 13 juillet 2022, un arbitre de l’OMC a rendu sa décision sur la méthode que le Canada peut utiliser pour fixer le niveau de la suspension de concessions ou d’autres obligations dans le secteur des marchandises vis-à-vis des États-Unis si, à l’avenir, ces derniers appliquent des droits compensateurs à des marchandises canadiennes sur la base d’une mesure jugée incompatible avec les règles de l’Organisation. Cette décision découle de la procédure de règlement des différends dans l’affaire “États-Unis — Mesures compensatoires visant le papier supercalandré en provenance du Canada” (DS505).

On 8 August 2023, the WTO circulated two panel reports in the cases brought by India and the United States in “United States — Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium Products” (DS547) and “India — Additional Duties on Certain Products from the United States” (DS585).

El 19 de diciembre de 2023, la OMC distribuyó el informe del grupo especial encargado de examinar el asunto “Turquía — Derechos adicionales sobre determinados productos procedentes de los Estados Unidos” (DS561), planteado por los Estados Unidos

Le 24 août 2023, l’OMC a distribué le rapport du Groupe spécial dans l’affaire introduite par l’Australie “Chine — Mesures antidumping et compensatoires visant l’orge en provenance d’Australie” (DS598).

On 19 December 2023, the WTO circulated the panel report in the case brought by the United States in “Turkey — Additional Duties on Certain Products from the United States” (DS561).

El 24 de agosto de 2023, la OMC distribuyó el informe del Grupo Especial relativo al asunto planteado por Australia en la diferencia “China — Medidas en materia de derechos antidumping y compensatorios sobre la cebada procedente de Australia” (DS598).

Le 19 décembre 2023, l’OMC a distribué le rapport du Groupe spécial chargé d’examiner l’affaire “Turquie — Droits additionnels visant certains produits en provenance des États-Unis” (DS561), introduite par les États-Unis

El 16 de agosto de 2023, la OMC distribuyó el informe elaborado por el grupo especial encargado de examinar el asunto “China — Derechos adicionales sobre determinados productos procedentes de los Estados Unidos” (DS558) planteado por los Estados Unidos.

Le 17 avril 2023, l’OMC a distribué les trois rapports des Groupes spéciaux chargés d’examiner les différends “Inde — Traitement tarifaire de certaines marchandises du secteur des technologies de l’information et de la communication” (DS582), “Inde — Traitement tarifaire de certaines marchandises” (DS584) et “Inde — Traitement tarifaire de certaines marchandises du secteur des technologies de l’information et de la communication” (DS588) introduits respectivement par l’Union européenne, le Japon et le Taipei chinois.

El 17 de abril de 2023, la OMC distribuyó tres informes de los grupos especiales en los asuntos planteados por la Unión Europea, el Japón y el Taipei Chino en “India — Trato arancelario de determinados productos del sector de la tecnología de la información y las comunicaciones” (DS582), “India — Trato arancelario de determinados productos” (DS584) e “India — Trato arancelario de determinados productos del sector de la tecnología de la información y las comunicaciones” (DS588), respectivamente.

Le 17 avril 2023, l’OMC a distribué les trois rapports des Groupes spéciaux chargés d’examiner les différends “Inde — Traitement tarifaire de certaines marchandises du secteur des technologies de l’information et de la communication” (DS582), “Inde — Traitement tarifaire de certaines marchandises” (DS584) et “Inde — Traitement tarifaire de certaines marchandises du secteur des technologies de l’information et de la communication” (DS588) introduits respectivement par l’Union européenne, le Japon et le Taipei chinois.

On 17 April 2023, the WTO circulated three panel reports in the cases brought by the European Union, Japan and Chinese Taipei in “India — Tariff Treatment on Certain Goods in the Information and Communications Technology Sector” (DS582), “India — Tariff Treatment on Certain Goods” (DS584) and “India — Tariff Treatment on Certain Goods in the Information and Communications Technology Sector” (DS588) respectively.

Le 20 février 2024, l’OMC a distribué le rapport du Groupe spécial chargé de la procédure de mise en conformité engagée par l’Union européenne dans l’affaire “États-Unis — Droits antidumping et compensateurs visant les olives mûres en provenance d’Espagne” (DS577).

El 20 de febrero de 2024, la OMC distribuyó el informe del grupo especial en el procedimiento sobre el cumplimiento iniciado por la Unión Europea en la diferencia “Estados Unidos — Derechos antidumping y compensatorios sobre las aceitunas negras procedentes de España” (DS577).

El 5 de marzo de 2024, la OMC distribuyó el informe del Grupo Especial encargado del asunto “Unión Europea y determinados Estados miembros — Determinadas medidas relativas al aceite de palma y los biocombustibles basados en cultivos de palma de aceite” (DS600).

Le 27 juillet 2023, l’OMC a distribué le rapport du Groupe spécial dans la procédure “République dominicaine — Mesures antidumping visant les barres en acier crénelées” (DS605) engagée par le Costa Rica.

On 27 July 2023, the WTO circulated the panel report in the case brought by Costa Rica in “Dominican Republic — Anti-dumping measures on corrugated steel bars” (DS605).

Le 19 juin 2023, l’OMC a distribué le rapport du Groupe spécial chargé d’examiner l’affaire introduite par le Japon “Chine — Mesures antidumping visant les produits en acier inoxydable en provenance du Japon” (DS601).

El 13 de julio de 2023, las partes notificaron a la OMC que habían llegado a una solución mutuamente convenida de las cuestiones planteadas en las dos diferencias. De conformidad con el artículo 12.7 del Entendimiento sobre Solución de Diferencias, en los informes de los grupos especiales se describen brevemente las diferencias, con indicación de que se han alcanzado soluciones.

“The WTO Analytical Index" is an article-by-article guide to the interpretation and application of the WTO agreements by WTO bodies. It covers the jurisprudence of the WTO Appellate Body, panels and arbitrators as well as related decisions and other significant actions taken by other relevant WTO bodies. This publication report covers the TPRM.

“The WTO Analytical Index" is an article-by-article guide to the interpretation and application of the WTO agreements by WTO bodies. It covers the jurisprudence of the WTO Appellate Body, panels and arbitrators as well as related decisions and other significant actions taken by other relevant WTO bodies. This publication report covers the TRIMs.

“The WTO Analytical Index" is an article-by-article guide to the interpretation and application of the WTO agreements by WTO bodies. It covers the jurisprudence of the WTO Appellate Body, panels and arbitrators as well as related decisions and other significant actions taken by other relevant WTO bodies. This publication report covers the WTO Agreement.

“The WTO Analytical Index" is an article-by-article guide to the interpretation and application of the WTO agreements by WTO bodies. It covers the jurisprudence of the WTO Appellate Body, panels and arbitrators as well as related decisions and other significant actions taken by other relevant WTO bodies. This publication report covers the International Dairy and Bovine Meat Agreements.

“The WTO Analytical Index" is an article-by-article guide to the interpretation and application of the WTO agreements by WTO bodies. It covers the jurisprudence of the WTO Appellate Body, panels and arbitrators as well as related decisions and other significant actions taken by other relevant WTO bodies. This publication report covers the Trade Facilitation.

“The WTO Analytical Index" is an article-by-article guide to the interpretation and application of the WTO agreements by WTO bodies. It covers the jurisprudence of the WTO Appellate Body, panels and arbitrators as well as related decisions and other significant actions taken by other relevant WTO bodies. This publication report covers the AR Working Procedures.

“The WTO Analytical Index" is an article-by-article guide to the interpretation and application of the WTO agreements by WTO bodies. It covers the jurisprudence of the WTO Appellate Body, panels and arbitrators as well as related decisions and other significant actions taken by other relevant WTO bodies. This publication report covers the Licensing.

“The WTO Analytical Index" is an article-by-article guide to the interpretation and application of the WTO agreements by WTO bodies. It covers the jurisprudence of the WTO Appellate Body, panels and arbitrators as well as related decisions and other significant actions taken by other relevant WTO bodies. This publication report covers the TBT.

“The WTO Analytical Index" is an article-by-article guide to the interpretation and application of the WTO agreements by WTO bodies. It covers the jurisprudence of the WTO Appellate Body, panels and arbitrators as well as related decisions and other significant actions taken by other relevant WTO bodies. This publication report covers the Textiles.

“The WTO Analytical Index" is an article-by-article guide to the interpretation and application of the WTO agreements by WTO bodies. It covers the jurisprudence of the WTO Appellate Body, panels and arbitrators as well as related decisions and other significant actions taken by other relevant WTO bodies. This publication report covers the GATT 1994.

“The WTO Analytical Index" is an article-by-article guide to the interpretation and application of the WTO agreements by WTO bodies. It covers the jurisprudence of the WTO Appellate Body, panels and arbitrators as well as related decisions and other significant actions taken by other relevant WTO bodies. This publication report covers the DSU.

“The WTO Analytical Index" is an article-by-article guide to the interpretation and application of the WTO agreements by WTO bodies. It covers the jurisprudence of the WTO Appellate Body, panels and arbitrators as well as related decisions and other significant actions taken by other relevant WTO bodies. This publication report covers the GATS.

“The WTO Analytical Index" is an article-by-article guide to the interpretation and application of the WTO agreements by WTO bodies. It covers the jurisprudence of the WTO Appellate Body, panels and arbitrators as well as related decisions and other significant actions taken by other relevant WTO bodies. This publication report covers the Customs Valuation Agreement.

The paper discusses the efforts deployed in 2008 and 2009 by various players, Governments, multilateral financial institutions, regional development banks, export credit agencies, to mobilize sufficient flows of trade finance to off-set some of the “pull-back” by commercial institutions in the period of acute crisis that has characterized the financial sector in the past two years. Given that 80 to 90% of trade transactions involve some form of credit, insurance or guarantee, one can reasonably say that supply-side driven shortages of trade finance have a potential to inflict further damages to international trade. As an institution geared towards the balanced expansion of world trade, the WTO had been concerned with occurrences of market tightening throughout this period. While a number of public-institutions mobilized financial resources for trade finance in the fall of 2008, this has not been enough to bridge the gap between supply and demand of trade finance worldwide. As the market situation continued to deteriorate in the first quarter of 2009, G-20 leaders in London (April 2009) adopted a wider package for injecting additional liquidity and bringing public guarantees in support of $250 billion of trade transactions in 2009 and 2010. Ahead of the Pittsburgh Meetings, experts reported that more than the targeted amount had been mobilized. In the meantime, through the summer and the fall of 2009, the market situation seemed to have eased – although in many countries, access to trade finance by the smaller traders had become either significantly more expensive or had simply disappeared. One can expect the trade finance market to have its up and downs for some time, because lending for trade is a function of the general lending situation of commercial banks. The paper discusses longer-term initiatives aimed at improving the resilience of the trade finance market to short-term and longer-term shocks.

Using the influence-driven approach to endogenous trade-policy determination, we show how a free-trade agreement (FTA) with rules of origin can work as a device to compensate losers from trade liberalization. The FTA constructed in this paper is characterized by external tariff structures that are negatively correlated across member countries, ensuring efficiency gains and, through reduced average protection, compatibility with the multilateral trading system's requirements. It is also politically viable, and we demonstrate that, in the countries concerned, governments are willing to include its formation in the political agenda in spite of the fact that, in equilibrium, political contributions from producer lobbies decline after the agreement.

The United Nations' post--2015- development agenda is taking shape. Like its predecessor the Millennium Development Goals, the post--2015- agenda will reshape development policy priorities for governments and non-governmental actors alike, in many cases galvanising new attention, thinking, and financing to tackle the priorities it identifies. This essay reviews the historical and ongoing role played by trade in sustained high growth and human development progress, and makes the case that the post--2015- development agenda should include considerations related to trade rules and supply-side capacity. Given the strong links between trade-led growth, economic upgrading, and poverty reduction, the paper argues that trade led economic growth must be prioritised in the post--2015- development agenda.

This paper analyses the results of the financial services negotiations under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) at the World Trade Organization (WTO). It shows that the negotiations have contributed to more stable and transparent policy regimes in many developing and transition countries. The wide range of market access and non-discrimination commitments should advance the process of progressive liberalization. The commitments do not compromise the ability of countries to pursue sound macroeconomic and regulatory policies. However, other aspects of the outcome do raise some concerns. First, there has been less emphasis on the introduction of competition through allowing new entry than on allowing (or maintaining) foreign equity participation and protecting the position of incumbents. Secondly, even where immediate introduction of competition was not deemed feasible, not much advantage has been taken of the GATS to lend credibility to liberalization programmes by precommitting to future market access.

The WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) is a plurilateral Agreement, meaning that it comprises only a subset of the full Membership of the WTO. Currently, a number of WTO Members that are not Parties to the Agreement either are actively seeking accession to it, have commitments to accede to the GPA in their respective WTO accession protocols or are, on their own initiative, looking at the potential pros and cons of accession. In this context, there is a need for factual information concerning the potential consequences of GPA accession, and a framework to assess related benefits and costs. Of interest is both the systemic value of such accessions – i.e. the value they will add to the extent of market access commitments under the Agreement – and their potential benefits and costs for individual acceding Parties. This Working Paper introduces new sources of information relevant to these topics (principally, the statistical reports that have been circulated recently by GPA Parties) and shows their relevance to and usefulness in assessing the above-noted matters. The Paper presents estimates of the size of potential market access gains from pending and possible future GPA accessions, based on simple extrapolations from the data sources identified. Next, the Paper shows how the same data sources can assist in throwing light on the potential benefits and costs of GPA accession for individual WTO Members/countries contemplating accession. The latter use of the data is developed in the context of a more general discussion of the benefits and costs of GPA accession for individual WTO Members, also drawing on existing literature, qualitative aspects and "insights from the field" (i.e. our own work in advising and conducting seminars for such countries and other WTO Members).

While conditions in trade finance markets returned to normality in the main routes of trade, the structural difficulties of poor countries in accessing trade finance have not disappeared – and might have been worsened during and after the global financial crisis. There is a consistent flow of information indicating that trade finance markets have remained characterized by a greater selectivity in risk-taking and flight to "quality" customers. In that environment, the lower end of the market has been struggling to obtain affordable finance, with the smaller companies in the smaller, poorer countries most affected. In an area where statistics are difficult to find, this paper looks at recent available information and provides background on the persistent and significant market gaps for trade finance in developing countries, notably in Africa and developing Asia. It discusses various initiatives in which the WTO and partner institutions are involved to alleviate in part this situation.

In 2003, the WTO General Council decided to provide an additional legal pathway for WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector to access medicines. Two years later, in 2005, WTO Members unanimously agreed to give this mechanism, often referred to as the "Paragraph 6 System", a permanent legal status when they adopted the Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement. The implementation and use of the additional pro-public health flexibilities provided by the System is optional, not mandatory. To take advantage of them, as of July 2015, 51 WTO Members have adopted specific implementing measures with a variable degree of detail and complexity which incorporate the Paragraph 6 System in their respective legal frameworks and provide the basis for them to act either as exporter or as importers, or as both. This represents almost a third of the WTO Membership, and the predominant bulk of existing pharmaceutical exporters. Given that, unlike other flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement, the Paragraph 6 System was devised as a new mechanism without previous domestic experience to draw upon, there seems to be an exceptional need for an in-depth discussion of how it has been implemented at country level to which this paper attempts to respond. There is, indeed, often limited knowledge in the policy and procurement communities about the wide range of specific measures that have been introduced in many major exporters of medicines and the importance of this information both from a practical point of view, to facilitate exports of needed medicines, and from a policy point of view, to understand the implementation of this novel tool for access to medicines. To contribute to a better understanding of how the System has been implemented in practice, this paper surveys domestic measures that WTO Members have put in place. By doing so, it can inform the broader dialogue about access to medicines and provide practical information for procurement programmes. It can also put a valuable source of information and inspiration at the disposal of those Members who are yet in the process of considering whether and how best to implement the Paragraph 6 System in their domestic legal framework. While the survey illustrates that a robust framework supportive of the export of generic medicines to meet public health needs has been put in place by a significant number of WTO Members, there is an obvious need to move a step forward and engage in a substantive review of the System, including if and how better, more frequent use could be made of it. To conclude, the paper therefore offers some elements for reflection regarding the way forward in order to support the functioning of the Paragraph 6 System.

The gains from trade depend on the reallocation of resources, including labour, across firms and sectors. However, workers are unlikely to be fully mobile since there are barriers to sectoral and geographical mobility due to social reasons such as family or existing private and professional networks. If these barriers depend on specific characteristics of workers, such as education, gender or race, this has important implications for inequality.

Natural resources account for 20% of world trade, and dominate the exports of many countries. Policy is used to manipulate both international and domestic prices of resources, yet this policy is largely outside the disciplines of the WTO. The instruments used include export taxes, price controls, production quotas, and domestic producer and consumer taxes (equivalent to trade taxes if no domestic production is possible). We review the literature, and argue that the policy equilibrium is inefficient. This inefficiency is exacerbated by market failure in long run contracts for exploration and development of natural resources. Properly coordinated policy reforms offer an avenue to resource exporting and importing countries to overcome these inefficiencies and obtain mutual gains.

Without transparency, trade agreements are just words on paper. Transparency as disclosure allows economic actors and trading partners to see how rules are implanted; transparency in decision-making ensures fairness and peer review. In the first section of this paper, I discuss the logic of transparency in general and the motivation for its use in the trading system. Considerable information on WTO transparency mechanisms is available in the Minutes and annual reports of the various WTO bodies, and in the Director-General’s annual overview of the trading system, but comparative analysis is not easy. In the second section, therefore, I develop a framework in which different transparency mechanisms can be compared to each other using the metaphor of three generations in the evolution of transparency in the trading system as a means of explaining how transparency works in the WTO. For sunshine to work, at least two things must happen. Information must be made available, and Members have to use it. Probing the extent to which Members comply with their notification obligations, in the third section, and their efforts to improve the notification process, allow an assessment of their commitment to being transparent. In the fourth section I consider how WTO committees are used to ensure that Members are accountable for their commitments, including to notify. Since the committees differ, I use the metaphor of the great pyramid of the legal order to compare committees to each other. Assessment of whether these mechanisms work underpins observations in the conclusion on whether more sunshine is needed, and efforts underway to improve existing mechanisms.

Most specific trade concerns (STCs), which are raised before the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Committee), disappear from the TBT Committee’s meeting agendas without escalating into formal disputes. At the same time, a relatively small number of TBT-related disputes have been subject to the WTO dispute settlement procedures. By examining the practice of raising STCs and the relationship between STCs and disputes, the paper emphasises the role of STCs as a trade tension resolution mechanism.