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This study surveys preferential rules of origin applied by 192 regional trade agreements (RTAs) covering trade in goods notified to the GATT/WTO up to 1 November 2010. It takes into account the preferential rules of origin that were notified to the WTO; whenever known and available, modifications to the original rules of origin have been updated. This study contains two basic features: a description of some key elements of preferential rules of origin in RTAs, followed by an attempt to provide a reality-check of how these rules affect actual trade. That is done by an ex-post examination of data on the use of RTAs' preferences and, in their absence, of their margins of preference (MOPs). While the raison d'être of preferential rules of origin is the avoidance of trade deflection, the practice in RTAs has diluted this objective and it would seem that preferential rules of origin are increasingly becoming an economic, political and trade instrument. In its descriptive part, the study identifies what seems to be a tendency to design stricter rules of origin, while detecting concomitantly the inclusion in modern preferential rules of origin of flexibilities that provide, through the rules of origin themselves, a preference beyond the lower tariff rate resulting from the preferential treatment and mechanisms that allow the integration of third-parties into preferential rules of origin regimes. The reality-check part of the study points to the fact that much beyond the coverage of RTAs, it is their effective implementation that poses a challenge to economic operators. Though data on the use of preferences is either not disclosed or inexistent, they are nevertheless available for some economies. On the basis of existing data of preference utilization, the analysis of the effects of rules of origin on preferential trade flows appears to give rise to a dual reality - namely a relatively high use of preferences in certain instances coexisting with preferences failing to attain their potential in other cases. As regards RTAs for which utilization rate is not available, the paper analysis preferential rules of origin from a MOPS perspective, assuming that MOPs of at least 5 percentage points would offset compliance costs and thus provide a stimulus to comply with rules of origin in order to benefit from preferences. The analysis, made for 68 out of 192 RTAs, do not allow any conclusion regarding that generally presented hypothesis. Finally, the paper briefly outlines some suggestions for further action, including the launching in the WTO of exploratory work on preferential rules of origin within an "open regionalism" scenario.

Rising current account and merchandise trade imbalances marked the years before the global financial and economic crisis. These imbalances either contributed to or precipitated the crisis and to the extent that they create systemic risks, it is desirable that they be reduced. There are many factors related to macroeconomic, structural, exchange rate and financial policies that contributed to the imbalances. The inability to manage these issues at the international level reflects the “coherence gap” in global governance. This paper examines the contribution that the WTO can make in its three areas of activities — negotiations, rule-making and dispute settlement — to deal with trade imbalances and with the main factors leading to them, including exchange rate misalignments. First, market opening efforts in services, including in the area of financial services, can reduce policy-related distortions and market imperfections in surplus countries that lead to the build-up of unsustainable imbalances. Second, in the context of a broad international effort to coordinate macroeconomic, exchange rate and structural policies to deal with the roots of imbalances (the first-best solution), there is a general efficiency argument that could be made for the use of WTO-triggered trade actions to enforce cooperative behaviour towards rebalancing. Absent this first-best response, trade rules alone would not provide an efficient instrument to compensate for the weaknesses in international co-operation in macroeconomic, exchange rate and structural policies.

Digital networks are an increasingly critical component of global trade. In 2017, the Global Review of Aid for Trade highlighted the importance of accessible and affordable connections for trade connectivity. Drawing extensively on information harvested in the Monitoring and Evaluation exercise in preparation for the Review, this paper analyses aid for trade for digital connectivity and e-commerce.

This paper assembles detailed information on the market access provisions in trade in goods contained in 192 active regional trade agreements (RTAs) notified to the WTO as of November 2010. Although market access provisions in trade in goods in RTAs have been addressed in a number of studies, much of this work has been limited to subsets of RTAs, particularly plurilateral RTAs involving three or more parties. The goal of the current study is to expand beyond the more commonly studied RTAs and to include all RTAs notified to the WTO for which data are available. This task has been facilitated by the recent Transparency Mechanism for RTAs (TM), adopted in 2006, that provides the basis for the systematic provision of detailed tariff and trade data by WTO Members engaged in RTAs. This information has been supplemented by other public sources of data, where available. A number of trends are evident. While a majority of RTAs result in a reasonably high degree of liberalization overall (with developing countries often liberalizing as much or more than developed countries), liberalization is not uniform across products or RTA parties. In some RTAs the degree of iberalization appears to be a negotiated outcome, depending on the RTA partner. Agricultural goods continue to be subject to lower levels of liberalization, frequent product exclusions and systematic protection in some RTAs, regardless of the RTA partner's comparative advantage. Nonetheless, a lower level of ambition in some RTAs is tempered by a commitment to negotiate further concessions or expand upon the RTA's scope at some future point: more than half the RTAs analysed contain such a commitment. Much has been written about the potential for the multilateralization of commitments undertaken in RTAs. While there may be scope for positive externalities in terms of regulatory convergence particularly with regard to services liberalization undertaken in RTAs, there is less evidence in this study to suggest that increased market access in merchandise goods leads to a more favourable trading environment for third parties. Continuing constructive engagement by WTO Members in the Transparency Mechanism through the provision of data, timely notifications, and submission of implementation reports will increase the availability of tariff and trade liberalization data, thus facilitating further examination of the topics highlighted in the study as worthy of future research.

Advances in information and communications technologies (ICTs) and new business models have widened opportunities for trade in digitized ideas, shaping global value chains and production networks in cultural or creative goods and services. However, much of this trade has eluded conventional categorization and new business models. In particular multinational firms have blurred the way international transactions can be recorded and how this can be transformed into relevant statistics for policy makers, research and for businesses themselves. Recent international statistical guidelines have suggested a number of improvements to better respond to policy information needs, including in the area of trade, innovation or culture. However, a number of questions remain unanswered. The objective of the paper is therefore to trace the conceptual and empirical statistical picture and assess the quality of existing statistics and the extent to which important trade in digitized ideas is inadequately measured. It discusses conceptual issues, and constraints encountered in gaining a full picture. A number of possible data collection and compilation solutions are suggested to enable a better understanding of this trade.

Trade costs such as applied tariffs, transportation and insurance costs are amplified as they pass through the multiple production steps associated with modern supply chains. This socalled "cascade effect" arises since trade costs accumulate as intermediate goods are imported and then re-exported further downstream, going through different processing nodes before reaching the final consumer. Moreover, the financial impact of these trade costs is magnified in the "trade in tasks" rationale which governs global value chains (GVCs). Specialised processing firms need to recoup the associated trade cost applying to the full value of the good from the smaller fraction of value-added created at each consecutive productive stage. This large relative weight of transaction expenses on the profitability of individual business operations explains why trade along GVCs is particularly exposed to trade costs. The paper reviews the implications of trade costs on competitiveness at industry, national and global levels. The financial implications of trade costs at firm and sectoral level are based on trade in value-added data for 2011. The multilateral welfare effects of reducing discrete trade costs are identified using a network analysis approach, which goes beyond the traditional bilateral dimension of international trade and identifies where trade facilitation investment would have the highest social returns from a GVC perspective. The authors conclude that while the direct benefits of trade facilitation will be proportionally higher for those countries that are not well integrated into international trade because of their high trade costs, the global benefits of trade facilitation investments will also be high if they are undertaken by key traders that lie at the core of global value chains.

This paper investigates whether TBT provisions included in RTAs differ from those under the WTO TBT Agreement, and, if they do, whether they entail broader commitments. Our analysis covers 238 RTAs, of which 171 include at least one provision, and focuses on the provisions on technical regulations, conformity assessment procedures, transparency, dispute settlement, marking and labelling and sector-specific commitments. We find that all RTAs signed since 2010 systematically include TBT provisions and that the most frequent provisions are those referring to the TBT Agreement and transparency. Moreover, even if there are RTAs that include new or broader commitments than the TBT Agreement, our study shows that their number remains very limited. For instance, relatively few RTAs have included provisions to better implement WTO provisions in the area of transparency or provisions requiring the equivalence or harmonization of technical regulations among the parties or even the recognition of conformity assessment results. RTAs with a dispute settlement provision that applies exclusively to TBT issues are also very few. These RTAs give in general exclusive jurisdiction to the WTO DSM over TBT related disputes. Finally, also only a minority of RTAs include provisions on new issues such as marking and labelling or sector-specific provisions, typically for electric and electronic products, pharmaceuticals or vehicles.

As an internationally standardized product nomenclature, the Harmonized System (HS) is used by WTO Members in their schedules of concessions and in the definitions of product coverage for a number of WTO agreements. The Harmonized System is normally amended by the World Customs Organization every four to six years. These amendments pose considerable challenges for the WTO and its Members. On the one hand, Members need to periodically update their historical schedules of concessions into the latest nomenclature. On the other hand, these amendments may have implications for the definition and thus also the implementation of some WTO agreements where the product coverage is defined in terms of the HS. In either case, the product codes and/or descriptions in the old HS version need to be transposed precisely into those in the new version of HS nomenclature in order to retain the historical concessions or the product coverage unchanged. Given the complexity of HS amendments, this process could be very technical and sometimes tricky. This paper starts by providing an overview of the HS amendments and proposing a categorization of those HS changes in the context of transposition. It then looks back at the history of the introduction of the HS and its subsequent amendments into the WTO schedules and assesses the difficulties and problems which have been faced by WTO Members. On the basis of such analysis, it introduces the successful procedures and methodologies used by WTO Members and the WTO Secretariat to deal with the recent HS2002 transposition. The paper also discusses the implications of the HS amendments to three WTO agreements and the possible approaches to transpose their product lists into a new HS nomenclature.

Most international commerce is carried out by multinational firms, which use their foreign affiliates for the majority of their foreign sales. In this paper, I examine the determinants of multinational firms’ location and production decisions and the welfare implications of multinational production. The few existing quantitative general equilibrium models that incorporate multinational firms achieve tractability by assuming away export platforms – i.e. they do not allow foreign affiliates of multinationals to export – or by ignoring fixed costs associated with foreign investment. I develop a quantifiable multi-country general equilibrium model, which tractably handles multinational firms that engage in export platform sales and that face fixed costs of foreign investment. I first estimate the model using German firm-level data to uncover the size and nature of costs of multinational enterprise and show that fixed costs of foreign investment are large. Second, I calibrate the model to data on trade and multinational production for twelve European and North American countries. Counterfactual results reveal that multinationals play an important role in transmitting technological improvements to foreign countries as they can jump the barriers to international trade; I find that a twenty percent increase in the productivity of US firms leads to welfare gains in foreign countries an order of magnitude larger than in a world in which multinational production is disallowed. I demonstrate the usefulness of the model for current policy analysis by studying the pending Canada-EU trade and investment agreement; I find that a twenty percent drop in the barriers to foreign production between the signatories would divert about seven percent of the production of EU multinationals from the US to Canada.

Economic theory has made considerable progress in explaining why sovereign countries cooperate in trade. Central to most theories of trade cooperation are issues of self-enforcement: The threat of reprisal by an aggrieved party maintains the initial balance of concessions and prevents opportunism. However, economic scholarship has been less coherent in explaining why countries choose to settle and enforce their trade disputes with the help of an impartial third party, a “trade court”. Typically, economists focusing on the purpose of trade agreements have assumed away the very reasons why institutions are needed, since under standard assumptions, neither defection from the rules nor disputes are expected to occur. This paper is a step towards the formulation of a coherent economic theory of dispute settlement. It challenges traditional models of enforcement (primarily concerned with acts of punishment) for being insufficient in explaining the existence of dispute settlement institutions. We perform a comprehensive analysis of the economics of dispute settlement institutions and demonstrate to what extent the literatures of trade cooperation and dispute institutions are (and should be) interlinked. On the basis of these theories, we show that dispute settlement institutions in trade agreements may assume a variety of roles, including that of an information repository and disseminator, an honest broker, an arbitrator and calculator of damages, an active information gatherer or an adjudicator.

This paper is concerned with three problems in the interpretation of the national treatment obligation in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). First, the precise domain of Article XVII on national treatment has not been clearly delineated, particularly in relation to Article XVI dealing with market access. Secondly, there is a difference between the text of Article XVII and the structure of the schedules of commitments, which makes it difficult to interpret the scope of the national treatment obligation even for identical services supplied through different modes. The final, and most complex, problem arises in establishing the definition of "like" services and "like" service suppliers. Uncertainty about the precise meaning of the national treatment obligation may undermine the key GATS objective of creating a secure, predictable trading environment. Moreover, the extent of liberalization implied by the commitments under GATS depends on the precise choice of interpretation.

At first glance, this paper deals with a simple classification issue only: the coverage and treatment of certain manufacturing operations and the resulting products under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) rather than under its long-standing counterpart in merchandise trade, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Yet there are important structural/conceptual differences between the two Agreements, which may have far-reaching consequences, inter alia, for the use of GATT-based tariffs and trade remedies (anti-dumping and countervailing measures). It is submitted that the currently applied classification system could prompt companies to (re-)define the ownership conditions of otherwise identical production activities, with a view to avoiding GATT disciplines. However, the relevant criteria separating goods- from services-related operations are not only hard to specify and monitor in practice, but it is also difficult to see an underlying policy rationale. In the interest of clarity and consistency, WTO Members might thus want to close this conceptual trapdoor. Due to the rapid proliferation of international production-sharing arrangements, the stakes will likely be rising.

Le concept d'assurance est fondé sur la mutualisation de risques futurs aléatoires moyennant le paiement en amont d'une contribution financière par le client (la prime d'assurance). Pour être effective, l'assurance suppose une confiance élevée de la part des clients dans la capacité des fournisseurs d'assurance (les compagnies d'assurance) à payer les dommages lorsqu'ils se matérialisent. Sinon, les clients ne payeraient pas leurs primes aux compagnies d'assurance.

The paper discusses the efforts deployed by various players, mainly multilateral financial institutions, regional development banks, export credit agencies, to mobilize greater flows of trade finance for developing countries, with a view to help them integrate in world trade. As an institution geared towards the balanced expansion of world trade, the WTO is in the business of making trade possible. Its various functions include reducing trade barriers, negotiating and implementing global trade rules, and settling disputes on the basis of the rule of law. The WTO is also interested in strengthening the "supply-side" of developing countries so that they can respond to new market opportunities. To this end, it supports various initiatives aimed at improving the "trade infrastructures" of developing countries, ranging from the ability to meet international product, safety and sanitary standards, to run efficient customs, or to participate effectively to the multilateral trade negotiations by training public servants. The WTO carries out various initiatives with other partners (public and private sector institutions), in the context of its own technical assistance program, or in the context of multi-agency projects such as the Integrated Framework or the Aid-for-Trade Initiative. Since more than 90% of trade transactions involve some form of credit, insurance or guarantee, one can reasonably say that trade finance is the lifeline of trade. Producers and traders in developing or least-developed countries need to have access to affordable flows of trade financing and insurance to be able to import and export, and hence integrate in world trade. From that perspective, an efficient financial system is one indispensable infrastructure to allow trade to happen. In line with the above initiatives, the WTO has been following actively, and at times, directly supporting, initiatives to boost the availability of trade finance in developing and least-developed countries wherever it was needed. Since the WTO is not a financial institution, it has been supporting in the past few years partners engaged in this effort such as international financial institutions, export credit agencies, large banks and regional development banks. Initially, the WTO has been asked by its members at several points in recent years to examine the issue of availability of trade financing – as a key infrastructure needed by developing and leastdeveloped countries to integrate in world trade. Paragraph 36 of the Ministerial Declaration of Doha requested WTO Members to examine, and if necessary come up with recommendations, on measures that the WTO could take, within its remit, to minimize the consequences of financial instabilities on their trade opportunities. In the context of the newly created Working Group on Trade, Debt and Finance (WGTDF), the interruptions of the flows of trade finance in emerging markets during the Asian and Latin American financial crises were quickly identified as concerns by Members, as well as the chronic difficulties of low income Members to secure more affordable flows of trade financing in the long-run. These concerns were channelled to the WTO Ministerial Meetings in Cancun (2003) and Hong-Kong (2005).2 During this period of examination, the Heads of the IMF, World Bank and the WTO agreed at the General Council Meeting on Coherence of 2002 to form an expert group including all interested parties, multilateral and regional public institutions, export credit agencies, private banks to examine what went wrong in this segment of financial markets, and how to create an enabling environment in local markets to provide adequate flows of trade finance on a on-going basis. In chairing one of these meetings, the Director-General of the WTO defined the role of the WTO in this area: encouraging liberalization of this type of financial services under the financial services agreement, being a regulator of export credit and guarantee subsidies under the ASCM, and serving as a forum to discuss WTO-compatible ways of providing support to developing countries. Conclusions by the Working Group were presented at the WGTDF, and later at the General Council. WTO Secretariat work on this topic up to 2003, in particular its contribution to the WGTDF and to the expert group, was summarized in WTO Discussion Paper 2.4 While the liquidity in financial markets improved from 2002 until the recent turmoil created by the crisis of the sub-prime mortgage markets, trade finance remained an issue for concern for WTO Members, in particular the poorest, which do not have access to international financial markets or for emerging markets which remain prone to changes in market sentiment, and hence credit rating. Despite the rapid development of "trade finance facilitation" schemes developed by regional development banks and the IFC, with immediate success in low income countries, the issue of availability of trade finance came back among other "supply-side" constraints identified by the Aidfor- Trade Task Force, after the WTO Ministerial Meeting in Hong-Kong. While the mandate of the WTO under the Aid-for-Trade is essentially one of evaluation and monitoring, it may be in cases one of advocacy. Based on the work being carried out since 2002, and after consultation with partners (regional development banks, multilateral institutions, export credit institutions,...), input by the WTO Secretariat to boost the availability of trade finance for developing countries under the Aid-for-Trade umbrella was welcomed by Members. Lack of trade financing and guarantee infrastructures were identified as one of the barriers to integration of low income countries in world trade by each of the three regional Aid-for-Trade Reviews. It was acknowledged that the current Aid-for-Trade Initiative could provide the extra leverage to convince WTO partners to deliver more plentiful of trade credit and guarantees to WTO members that need it the most. This paper provides background on the difficulties of some countries and traders to access affordable trade credit and finance, on the growing divide between these low income countries and economically advanced countries in handling modern trade finance instruments, and on the joint reflection undertaken by the WTO, most recently under the Aid-for-Trade programme, and previously under the umbrella of the WGTDF and the Coherence Mandate, to help strengthen developing countries' capacities in this area.

Discussions about international capital movements raise extremely important and controversial questions. Why should countries open up their capital accounts, especially considering that unrestricted international capital movement is a relatively new phenomenon? For example, many OECD countries have not eliminated their foreign exchange restrictions only until the 1980's. If the answer is unequivocally affirmative, does it matter how fast should countries do so? Should they wait until "all essential pieces" of the policy package are in place before they eliminate all restrictions? How are international capital movements related to domestic financial sectors? Is there a difference between opening to competition an industry such as car manufacturing as compared to the banking sector? Should the opening of the banking sector be governed by different rules? Rules about foreign exchange restrictions are already in place in the IMF Articles. Until recently, the IMF Articles only called for the elimination of foreign exchange restrictions on the current account. The ongoing discussion and the controversy about globalization that calls for the capital account liberalization introduces, therefore, a relatively new element into the whole discussion. These questions have also implications for the World Trade Organization. It is well known, that the Uruguay Round Agreements have already provided a coverage for a number of aspects that are directly related to foreign investment. Rules established elsewhere such as in the context of changes to the IMF Articles will obviously have an important bearing for the implementation of rules agreed in the Uruguay Round. This raises a variety of other questions in the mind of some observers. Who should decide about the rules on capital account liberalization? What rules? IMF? What is the role of the WTO? How does one link the two? All of the questions raised above are clearly extremely important and most of them are discussed in the following paper by John Williamson. Mr. Williamson's presentation is based on his lecture and discussion which was delivered on 17 June 1999 at the WTO. The actual text that follows is a transcript of that lecture.

The system of global agricultural and food trade is undergoing rapid processes of change, with important implications for economic development. In this paper we document and discuss these changes; including the rapid growth and structural change in agri-food trade, the increased consolidation in food supply chains, the proliferation of public and private food standards, high and volatile food prices, and increased vertical coordination in the chains. We investigate what the implications are of these changes for developing countries, for their participation in international agricultural trade as well as for economic development, income mobility and poverty reduction in rural areas.

The General Agreement on Trade in Services (known as the GATS) is an important new element in the international framework that affects the regulation of every WTO Member's financial sector. However, except for a limited number of country-specific case studies, no attempt has been made to compare WTO commitments to open the domestic banking sector to foreign banks with actual regulatory practice in a systematic and comprehensive manner on a cross-country basis. Nor has much attention been devoted to systematically and comprehensively assess the degree to which WTO Members discriminate against foreign bank. This paper draws upon a new and comprehensive dataset consisting of the commitments countries made at the WTO and the regulations actually imposed on foreign banks by those countries. The dataset covers 123 WTO Members for whom there was also information available on their current regulatory regime for banking (based on the responses to a World Bank survey as discussed in Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2006)). On the basis of that data, the authors develop indices measuring the degree of openness to foreign banking based upon both commitments made and actual regulatory practice, with a view to assessing the overall extent to which countries open their borders to foreign banks more than they are legally obliged to do based upon their WTO commitments. The dataset is also used to assess the overall extent to which countries discriminate against foreign banks by regulating them less favorably than domestic banks. Although our results are still quite preliminary, they do show substantial divergences between commitments and practices. Indices of market openness and discrimination reveal wide differences among the 123 countries in the sample. The paper also identifies various factors that help explain the level of commitments that WTO Members have made.

Are market access commitments on services in Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) reciprocal or simply unilateral? If reciprocal, do concessions granted in services depend on concessions received from the trading partner in other services or in non-services areas as well? In this paper we investigate the presence of reciprocity in bilateral services agreements, by sub-sector, mode of supply and type of agreement (North-North, South-North, South-South). To do so, we use a database of concessions given and received by 36 WTO Members in 40 services PTAs. Results reveal the presence of reciprocity at the product (sub-sector) level and across economic sectors (i.e., preferences in services trade in exchange for preferences received in goods trade). Reciprocity is stronger in agreements between developed countries. The findings provide insights into motivations for services PTAs, but also the multilateral negotiations. Indeed, the negotiation of services PTAs provides an incentive to withhold services offers in the Doha Round in order to extract more - reciprocal- concessions at a bilateral level. The existence of reciprocity on a sectoral basis may also hold lessons on optimal ways to improve the multilateral negotiating process.

Special and differential treatment (S&D) for developing countries continues to be a defining feature of the multilateral trading system. This paper seeks to address key aspects of what has become an increasingly entangled and multi-faceted discussion. The paper begins by reviewing the historical context in which the relationship of developing countries with the multilateral trading system evolved. The paper distinguishes several elements in the case typically made for S&D. It argues that concerns about graduation — the definition of which countries qualify for special treatment —have complicated progress on this issue, suggesting that a focus on measures rather than on country status would obviate this difficulty, while at the same time increasing the analytical underpinning of the case for special and differential treatment. The paper explores various forms of S&D and develops arguments for particular approaches to the design and management of access to S&D. An illustration is provided of how a more analytical approach would work by defining eligibility automatically in relation to measures rather than countries.

Management of capital inflows has unexpectedly become a major challenge in transition economies. These countries were expected to have an insatiable demand for foreign capital, and an excess demand for capital inflows was, therefore, predicted by most observers. Foreign investors are also known to be very selective in their choice of markets, and these countries were a big unknown. Moreover, macroeconomic policy in these countries has been dominated by the objective of disinflation. We explain in this paper the reasons why some transition countries have been an attractive market for foreign investors and how important has foreign capital been for these countries. But the bulk of the paper provides an assessment of government policies to manage foreign capital inflows. We evaluate the policies against the background of different government objectives and in terms of the actual policy instruments used by the monetary authorities, the timing and sequencing and the costs of these interventions. We argue that the initial responses to capital surges were poor; the authorities were reluctant to adjust their original policies and learn from the experiences elsewhere. Eventually, their policy responses were changed but until the costs of inertia became too high. The authorities have effectively used sterilization policies, more flexible exchange rate policies combined with tight monetary and fiscal policies. They also understood that an effective management of capital flows must start from well functioning markets, and have been prepared to adopt structural policies whenever market imperfections could be identified.

The customs union between the European Union (EU) and Turkey, which entered into force in January 1996, extended and deepened the Association Agreement, signed in 1964 and which foreshadows full EU membership for Turkey. In a number of areas, the new relationship goes beyond the minimum requirements for a customs union: Turkey is also having to implement a number of measures which are part of the acquis communautaire, similar to those applicable within the EU. This paper addresses the question whether this adoption of the EU model is beneficial to Turkey and third countries. The importance of this issue is the spreads of this model through the extension of the EU itself and the building of an increasing web of partnerships between the EU and other countries in Central and Eastern Europe as well as Mediterranean countries. Moreover, other regions are looking at the EU model as a way in which to deepen their own preferential trading arrangements.

Commitments in regional trade agreements (RTAs) that fall short of the same countries' obligations under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) are a relatively frequent phenomenon. However, they have gone widely unnoticed in the literature to date and drawn very little attention in relevant WTO fora either. Nevertheless, 'minus commitments' are potentially poisonous and, for various reasons, would deserve close attention. Given the broad definitional scope of the GATS, extending inter alia to commercial presence, such commitments may impinge upon the rights of third-country investors in the RTA economies. Their existence casts doubts on the legal status of the respective agreements under the GATS and can have severe implications for the trading system overall. If not complemented by comprehensive Most-favoured-Nation clauses, the RTAs concerned are disconnected from the WTO and virtually impossible to multilateralize. Based on a review of some 80,000 commitments in 66 agreements, this study seeks to develop a reasonably comprehensive picture of the frequency of 'minus commitments' and their dosage in terms of sectors, measures and modes of supply. It also discusses potential remedies from a WTO perspective.

Policy uncertainty can delay investment and reduce the response to policy change. I provide theoretical and novel quantitative evidence for these effects by focusing on trade policy, a ubiquitous but often overlooked source of uncertainty, when a firm's cost of export market entry is sunk. While an explicit purpose of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is to secure long term market access, little theoretical and empirical work analyzes the value of WTO institutions for reducing uncertainty for prospective exporters. Within a dynamic model of heterogeneous firms, I show that trade policy uncertainty will delay the entry of exporters into new markets and make them less responsive to applied tariff reductions. Policy instruments that reduce or eliminate uncertainty such as binding trade policy commitments at the WTO can increase entry even when applied protection is unchanged. I test the model using a disaggregated and detailed dataset of product level Australian imports in 2004 and 2006. I use the variation in tariffs and binding commitments across countries, products and time, to construct model-consistent measures of uncertainty. The estimates indicate that lower WTO commitments increase entry. Reducing trade policy uncertainty is at least as effective quantitatively as unilateral applied tariff reductions for Australia. These results illuminate and quantify an important new channel for trade creation in the world trade system.

WTO arbitrators rely on economics to establish the permissible retaliation limits authorized by the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) which arguably serves to enforce the overall agreement. We examine how theoretical and quantitative economic analysis has and can be used in this stage of the DSU process. First, we identify, characterize, and categorize the major classes of disputes – e.g., those affecting import protection versus export promotion – and use the Bagwell and Staiger interpretation of the WTO principle of reciprocity to provide a theoretical framework that arbitrators can use to identify the maximum level of retaliatory countermeasures. Second, we allocate each of the ten DSU arbitrations that have taken place thus far into one of these categories and compare the arbitrators’ actual approach with the theory. Third, we use this framework to identify three crucial elements to the arbitrators' decisionmaking process for each case: i) the formula that they decide to adopt for identifying appropriate countermeasures, ii) their political-legal-economic decision on a WTOconsistent counterfactual to use to implement the formula, and iii) the quantitative methods they use to necessarily construct the (unobserved) WTO-consistent counterfactual. We examine not only the arbitrations that have taken place thus far, but our approach also illustrates a template for many additional types of arbitrations likely to take place under the DSU. Finally, in the disputes in which this reciprocity approach has not been used, we identify procedural difficulties that arbitrators confront thus highlighting the constraints that hinder their use of economic analysis in practice.

We estimate the effects of trade facilitation on the extensive margins of trade. Using OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators – which closely reflect the Trade Facilitation Agreement negotiated at the Bali WTO Ministerial Conference of December 2013 – we show that trade facilitation in a given exporting country is positively correlated with the number of products exported by destination and with the number of export destinations served by product. To address the issue of causality, we employ an identification strategy whereby only exports of new products, or exports to new destinations, are taken into account when computing the respective margins of trade. Our findings therefore imply a positive causal impact of trade facilitation on the extensive margins of trade. The results are, to a large extent, robust to alternative definitions of extensive margins, to different sets of controls variables and to various estimation methods. Simulating the effect of an increase to the regional or global median values of trade facilitation, we are able to quantify the potential extensive margin gains of trade facilitation reform in different regions.

Better information on how services policies vary across economies and sectors over time would improve the empirical analysis of their impact. This paper describes the Services Trade Policy Database (STPD), a joint initiative by the World Bank and the WTO Secretariat, which builds on a database developed by the World Bank nearly ten years ago and draws on a recent OECD database.

Bangladesh's international image is not as a popular tourism destination, and many people might be surprised to learn it has three World Heritage sites, including the Sundarbans tiger reserves. Moreover, it is part of important travel circuits for cultural and religious tourism, and has demonstrated potential for sports tourism. The objective of this working paper is to critically test the assertion that pro-poor "green" tourism is one of the best development options for the majority of least developed countries (LDCs) -- a challenging task in Bangladesh in the face of the country's success as an exporter of readymade garments -- by comparing tourism to the available alternatives with regard to the crucial government priorities of export diversification, employment generation and the "green economy". It is well-known that Bangladesh is under strong pressure to diversify its exports, to generate new employment (especially in rural areas), and to respond to critical environmental issues. The government has identified over 30 "thrust sectors" (including tourism) to help address these challenges, but otherwise tourism is rarely mentioned as a major trade and development option for Bangladesh. Within the limitations of data availability, this working paper reaches the conclusion that greater efforts to develop "green" tourism would be highly beneficial for facilitating rural development, environmental and cultural protection, gender equality, and export diversification in services. The most obvious current impediments are inadequate infrastructure, lack of investment and (typically election year) political conflict, but behind these factors appear to be a serious lack of stakeholder coordination, insufficient regulatory and administrative transparency and coherence, as well as some government reluctance to relinquish greater commercial autonomy in tourism to the private sector. This paper offers extensive analysis and some suggestions to help address the impediments, including the recommendation to create a Bangladesh Tourism Stakeholders Forum.

Regional Trade agreements (RTAs) are sometimes considered as laboratories in which new types of provisions are negotiated to address recent trade-related issues. Although the inclusion of gender-related provisions in RTAs is not a recent phenomenon, only a limited but increasing number of RTAs refer explicitly to gender-related issues. These gender-related provisions are highly heterogeneous and differ in terms of location in the RTA, language, scope and commitments. Some of the most detailed gender-related provisions are found in stand-alone chapters on gender. Cooperation provisions on gender-related issues, including labour, health and social policy, remain the most common type of gender-related provisions found in RTAs.

Economists have increasingly become involved in trade remedy and litigation matters that call for economic interpretation or quantification. The literature on the use of econometric methods in response to legal requirements of trade policy is rather limited. This article contributes to filling this gap by demonstrating the efficacy of using a simple ‘probabilistic’ model in analyzing the ‘likelihood’ of injury to the local industry concerned, following a finding of continuation or recurrence of dumping (or countervailable subsidies). The legal concept of ‘likelihood’ is not only particularly well-suited to illustrate the systemic need for trade lawyers and economists to cooperate. It is also of imminent practical relevance with a groundswell of ‘sunset’ reviews looming on the horizon. We discuss the significance of economic analysis for trade remedy investigations by reviewing the literature, the applicable WTO rules and, in particular, the pertinent case law. The potential value of probabilistic simulations for ‘likelihood’ determinations is exemplified using a real-world application. Using data from past United States International Trade Commission investigations, we find that a probabilistic model that takes account of the uncertainty surrounding economic parameters reduces the risk of misjudging the effect on the domestic industry of a termination of trade remedies.

In the 1970s, taxation of "windfall" profits from primary products and intervention in trade and production tempted governments into expansionary fiscal policies, whilst stifling the private sector and depressing growth. However, the experience of the recent coffee boom has so far been more favourable: those African countries which liberalized and left a large share of the “windfall” with the private sector, and which committed themselves to fiscal austerity via adjustment programs have shown better results in terms of fiscal stability, private sector responses and economic growth than countries which did not reform. These findings suggest that constraints on discretionary government policies are desirable, and that domestic institutions and international commitments could serve this purpose.

This paper brings together three strands of literature on the determinants of international trade – distance, formal, and informal institutions – to explain differences in export performance across countries. Using an augmented gravity model, we find that the importance of formal institutions (rule of law) for bilateral trade increases with distance.

While greater focus has been cast on analysis of policy changes affecting trade in goods in the aftermath of the financial crisis, little is known about the direction of policies affecting trade in services. On the basis of information contained in the I-TIP Services database, this paper provides an overview of the evolution of services trade policies since 2000, where policy changes – whether towards more liberalization or more protection – tend to be less easily reversible and to have a greater impact. Has protectionism increased in the aftermath of the crisis? Which countries, sectors and modes of supply have been associated with most trade facilitating and trade-restrictive measures? The evidence gathered contradicts in many respects basic political economy expectations. Indeed, the countries, sectors and modes of supply where liberalizing and protectionist measures have been implemented are not necessarily those one would have assumed. Most importantly, trade-facilitating measures have clearly outweighed trade-restrictive ones over the recent period, including after the onset of the crisis. This strong push towards autonomous liberalization bodes well for trade negotiations on trade in services. The undertaking of greater commitments would bring benefits by consolidating this recent liberalization and by helping to reduce non-negligible outbursts of protectionism that have been witnessed over the last years. However, bilateral and plurilateral agreements, because of their limited country coverage, would only capture a fraction of the recent autonomous liberalization and, similarly, only help prevent part of the protectionist measures springing up.

With international trade moving from "trade in (final) goods" to "trade in tasks", effective protection rates (EPRs) are back to the stage, allowing us to measure the overall protection of a product or sector by including the production structure and the origin of the inputs -domestic or imported. Input-output matrices are used in this paper to monitor the production structure of 10 Asian-Pacific countries between 1995 and 2005, and to calculate sectorial EPRs. The paper proposes a series of counter-factual simulation methods aimed at isolating the specific contribution of changes in tariff policies, in production structure or in real exchange rates. Working on international input output matrices allowed also to compute and compare the average propagation length of a cost-push linked to a sudden change in tariff duties, identifying those sectors that are the most deeply interconnected, both in the intensity and in the length of their inter-industrial foreign relationships.

Global Manufacturing and International Supply Chains changed the way trade and international economics are understood today. The present essay builds on recent statistical advances to suggest new ways of looking at the demand and supply side approaches when Global Value Chains (GVCs) — articulating supply and demand chains from an international perspective-are taken into consideration. This pilot case focuses on the G-20 countries, a group of leading developed and developing economies which took a prominent role in fostering and managing global economic governance. The paper is organised into two independent parts. The demand dynamics is first analysed through a growth-accounting decomposition, then through the long term determinants of income elasticity of imports. The second part looks at the implications of global manufacturing for our understanding of the supply-side growth dynamics, privileging a trade perspective: the definition of comparative advantages and the potential for value-chain up-grading.

The main purpose of the paper is to present the coverage of SPS systems in SSA countries by TPR reports, and their main findings. It also opens the discussion as to whether the SPS analytical framework in TPR reports has been sufficiently comprehensive and beneficial in guiding technical assistance (TPR follow-up) activities in SSA. At the outset, we briefly present the strategic importance of agriculture in SSA countries, with a description of the link between an effective SPS regulatory system and the performance of agriculture.

A little over a decade has passed since the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008. Shortly after the collapse of the Lehman Brothers investment bank, an internal Secretariat Task Force was established by the WTO Director-General to monitor the trade-related developments associated with the crisis. Meeting in London in early 2009, the G20 Leaders mandated the WTO, together with other international bodies, to monitor and report publicly on G20 adherence to resisting protectionism and promoting global trade and investment. Since then, 22 G20 reports and 24 WTO-wide reports have been published.

This paper is a literature survey of some relevant issues arising from environmental quality provision and eco-labelling schemes. First of all it is shown how the two topics are strictly related. Firms adopting a production process (or producing a good) more environmentally friendly than others (environmental quality provision aspect) may want to make it public (eco-labelling aspect). The survey addresses the question of optimal environmental quality provision (also as a policy tool) and firms compliance. With regard to eco-labelling, its impacts on market structure are analysed. It hasn’t been possible to consider all issues, like for example that of moral hazard in providing non truthful information. Different issues related to trade are also analysed, even if the literature is not abundant on this yet. In the literature both aspects, of environmental quality provision and eco-labelling, are analysed using product differentiation models. The usual result is that multiple equilibria arise depending also on the parameters. Models are also not robust to different assumptions. Environmental quality provision and eco-labelling are also compared to more traditional policy instruments like taxes (or subsidies) and standards. From the empirical evidence it can be concluded that information plays a crucial role both for consumers’ and producers’ decisions. Consumers are willing to pay a higher price to be informed about the greenness of a good, and a label can really be a determinant in their choice of which brand to purchase. On the supply side, disclosing information about the environmental performance of a firm can affect investment decisions and its stock value.

This paper examines the interplay between exchange rate regimes and policies and commercial policy in six transition economies. In all these economies the rate of protection afforded domestic industry by the exchange rate has been eroded by high rates of inflation and insufficient growth in productivity. As a result, there has been pressure on governments to increase trade barriers and each country examined has had recourse to various means of restricting imports. We argue that more flexible management of the nominal exchange rate would be a preferable way of dealing with the real appreciation of these countries’ currencies.

This paper analyses the role of services in international trade through the lens of global value chains (GVCs). Services account for more than 70% of world GDP but only for around 20% of world trade in balance of payments terms. In value added terms, accounting for services embodied in exported goods, services account for 40% of world trade. Services industries increasingly produce in networked or "fragmented" arrangements. The paper lays out conceptual and measurement issues related to services networks and provides evidence based on trade in value added statistics and on a case study on the film industry. In contrast to goods value chains, services networks appear less fragmented internationally based on trade in value added statistics and survey evidence. However, to better capture the international services fragmentation, advances in statistics by enterprise characteristics and by mode of supply, i.e. taking into account the movement of labour and capital, are required.

It has become increasingly common to produce goods in a number of geographically dispersed stages linked by international trade. This tendency, known by names such as “production fragmentation”, “processing trade”, and “vertical specialization”, has important implications for the analysis of non-tariff measures (NTMs) and trade facilitation. First, different types of NTMs or trade facilitation issues are naturally associated with different stages in the movement of goods. Different price gaps can be assigned to these stages, making it possible to decompose the overall amount of distortion and to prioritize the policies with the largest potential efficiency gains. Second, NTMs may accumulate in long supply chains, implying that their trade-distorting effects are greater for goods produced in a fragmented manner than for goods with simple production processes. There is evidence that trade costs are more important for high technology goods or goods undergoing several stages of processing. Issues with product standards may be particularly important for goods with long supply chains. The link between NTMs and supply chains also has implications for economic development and for the relationship between liberalization in services and goods.

The paper discusses a number of issues related to the treatment of trade credit internationally, a priori (treatment by banking regulators) and a posteriori (treatment by debtors and creditors in the case of default), which are currently of interest to the trade finance community, in particular the traditional providers of trade credit and guarantees, such as banks, export credit agencies, regional development banks, and multilateral agencies. The paper does not deal with the specific issue of regulation of official insured-export credit, under the OECD Arrangement, which is a specific matter left out of this analysis. Traditionally, trade finance has received preferred treatment on the part of national and international regulators, as well as by international financial agencies in the treatment of trade finance claims, on grounds that trade finance was one of the safest, most collateralized, and selfliquidating forms of trade finance. Preferred treatment of trade finance also reflects the systemic importance of trade, as in sovereign or private defaults a priority is to "treat" expeditiously trade lines of credits to allow for such credit to be restored and trade to flow again. It is not only a matter of urgency for essential imports to be financed, but also a pre-condition for economic recovery, as the resumption of trade is necessary for ailing countries to restore balance of payments equilibrium. The relatively favourable treatment received by trade finance was reflected in the moderate rate of capitalization for cross-border trade credit in the form of letters of credit and similar securitized instruments under the Basel I regulatory framework, put in place in the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, as the banking and regulatory communities moved towards internal-rating based and risk-weighted assets systems under the successor Basel II framework, a number of complaints emerged with respect to the treatment of trade credit – particularly in periods of crisis. Issues of pro-cyclicality, maturity structure and country risk have been discussed at some length in various fora, including in the WTO at the initiative of Members. Part of the issue was that Basel II regulation was designed and implemented in a manner that, in periods of banking retrenchment, seemed to have affected the supply of trade credit more than other potentially more risky forms of lending. With the collapse of trade in late 2008 and early 2009, the regulatory treatment of trade credit under Basel II clearly became an issue and was discussed by professional banking organizations, regulators and international financial institutions. A sentence made its headway into the communiqué of G-20 Leaders in London in April 2009, calling upon regulators to exercise some flexibility in the application of Basel II rules, in support of trade finance. As the issue of removing the obstacles to the supply of trade finance spread became part of the public debate, discussions with respect to the regulatory treatment of trade finance in the context of the making of "Basel III" rules are now raising political attention. Part of the underlying problem regarding the design of regulation of trade finance is that banking regulators may not have enough understanding of the way that trade and trade finance operate in practice. In turn, the banking community has made insufficient progress in explaining these issues to regulators and in providing evidence about the high level of safety and soundness of their activity, in collecting statistical information and even in defining clearly what comprises trade finance. This paper aims at clarifying such issues. The WTO, in its role as an "honest broker", is trying to help the parties concerned, and has been asked from time to time to act as a go-between between the two communities, in order to clarify issues. Section 1 looks at the overall Basel framework and its evolution over time, with particular emphasis on the regulation of trade finance. Section 2 looks at issues raised in the WTO context by the trading and trade finance communities, be it by WTO Members or by experts, and how this has helped to clarify some of the disputed issues. Section 3 raises a number of questions which need clarification from the trade finance community for regulators to be able to better capture the reality of trade finance operations, and allow them to regulate with full understanding of its implications.

This document provides a technical description of the WTO Global Trade Model developed by the Center for Global Trade Analysis (GTAP) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). The model can be used to generate global trade projections and to assess the medium and long run effects of a wide range of global and national trade policies.

There are various conceivable links between services liberalization and poverty reduction, including the efficiency effects associated with increased competition in intermediate (infrastructural) services, income transfers generated by workers moving abroad, or the mobilization of private investment for social policy purposes. Arguably the most promising option for interested governments, regardless of complementary moves by trading partners, is the opening of, and creation of favourable investment conditions in, core infrastructural services. However, apart from basic telecommunications, both the Uruguay Round schedules and the offers submitted in the Doha Round to date have remained disappointing in this respect. Effective services liberalization, as measured by the share of phase-in commitments in total commitments, has occurred mainly in the context of WTO accessions and Preferential Trade Agreements. Given the apparent lack of political impetus in broader-based trade rounds, this article discusses options how the submission of more meaningful offers could be encouraged.

In recent years, our understanding of the nature of energy price shocks and their effects on the economy has evolved dramatically. Only a few years ago, the prevailing view in the literature was that at least the major crude oil prices increases were exogenous with respect to the OECD economies and that these increases were caused by oil supply disruptions triggered by political disturbances in the Middle East. This view has little empirical support. Likewise, the popular notion that OPEC constitutes a cartel that controls the price of oil has not held up to scrutiny. At the same time, there has been increasing recognition of the importance of shifts in the demand for oil. Recent research has provided robust evidence that oil demand shocks played a central role in all major oil price shock episodes since the 1970s.

Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic there has been a discussion among researchers and policy makers about changes to global value chains, both about expected changes and changes that should be promoted by government policies. In this paper we conduct an in-depth analysis of the reasons for changes in global value chains as a result of COVID-19 both from a positive angle, analysing expected changes in the behaviour of firms, and from a normative angle, assessing the different arguments for policy interventions by governments. After this analysis international cooperation of trade policies and the role of WTO in crises like the COVID-19 pandemic is explored.

The EU's import policies towards developing countries are complex, stemming from important sectoral and country variations in policy. Average tariffs are modest, and, while there are tariff peaks and escalation in some areas of interest to developing countries, these are being reduced as a result of the implementation of the results of the Uruguay Round. The use of non-tariff measures has fallen, particularly as a result of agricultural tariffication, and is being further reduced in textiles and clothing. The elimination of VERs has not led to an increase in the use of alternative measures. Contingency protection falls more heavily in chemicals, iron and steel, certain textile items and certain electrical consumer goods and on Asian, Central and Eastern European and former Soviet Union countries. The operation of various factors appears to be working to mitigate the use of trade defence measures in recent years, helping to counter pressures that seem likely to arise as liberalization proceeds.

To date, government procurement has been effectively carved out of the main multilateral rules of the WTO system. This paper examines the systemic and other ramifications of this exclusion, from both an economic and a legal point of view. In addition to relevant elements of the WTO Agreements, particularly the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), it derives insights from a large number of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) that embody substantive provisions on both government procurement and services trade. An important finding is that, from an economic perspective, general market access commitments with respect to services trade and commitments regarding government procurement of services are complementary and mutually reinforcing. In contrast, from a legal point of view and at the multilateral level, disciplines in the two areas have been "divided up" into two Agreements with different (but complementary) spheres of application: the key provisions regarding the scope of application of the GATS and the GPA make clear that each serves purposes that the other does not. Analysis of corresponding provisions of RTAs broadly supports and extends this finding. In light of the foregoing, a question arises as to possible ways of deepening disciplines in this area. Part 5 sets out, for reflection, several related options: (i) the built-in mandate in the GATS for negotiations on services procurement (Article XIII:2); (ii) "multilateralization" of the GPA; (iii) the eactivation of work in the (currently inactive) WTO Working Group on Transparency in Government Procurement; and (iv) the taking up of relevant issues in the context of bilateral or regional negotiations. Overall, we find that each of these possibilities has potential merits, though none is without related challenges.

As of November 2010, more than 300 regional trade agreements (RTAs) were in force. Approximately two-thirds of them had been notified to the WTO. Each of these RTAs had, implicitly or explicitly, established a regional legal framework for the application of intra-regional, and sometimes extra-regional, antidumping actions. This study focuses on intra-regional antidumping regimes and has been built around the analysis of antidumping provisions in 192 RTAs. This Working Paper first recalls the main constitutive elements of the multilateral and regional legal frameworks, a pre-requisite to consider if these rules and disciplines are competing with or are complementary to multilateral disciplines. Based on an analysis of these 192 RTAs, the Paper identifies two Categories of regional antidumping regimes, and assesses their relationships with the multilateral rules. Particular attention is paid to antidumping regimes in RTAs, which appear to "diverge" from the WTO disciplines. The Paper concludes that most regional antidumping regimes do not fundamentally change the Parties' rights to take antidumping measures, as compared with the multilateral regime. There appears to be no evidence that regional antidumping regimes increase RTA partners' rights to take antidumping actions at the intra-RTA level, and only a minority of regimes contains disciplines which diverge from multilateral rules, though most of those do not result in fundamental changes in the antidumping patterns of the RTA Parties. The Paper notes, however, that deep integration among a few RTAs has been decisive in bringing about a substantial change in the antidumping patterns of the RTA Parties concerned. It finds that legal consolidation, at the regional level, of a current practice of not using antidumping as a trade policy tool is restricted to a limited number of Parties. A few others seem to have used RTAs to restrict the possibility of using anti-dumping between RTA partners, as compared to multilateral rules. The Paper finally suggests that the proliferation of regional transparency mechanisms, related to antidumping may potentially undermine the oversight role of the multilateral trading system if "information diversion" materializes.

This paper attempts to fill a gap in the trade literature by providing a comprehensive overview of services liberalization commitments in the new generation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) as compared to prevailing GATS commitments and Doha Round offers. By developing a new database, the paper reviews the commitments undertaken by 29 WTO Members (counting the EC as one) under mode 1 (cross-border supply) and mode 3 (commercial presence) in 28 PTAs negotiated since 2000. The paper presents a general analysis from both a cross-country and cross-sector perspectives, and also examines in more detail the GATS+ commitments undertaken in a number of key sectors (audiovisual, distribution, education, financial, professional, and telecommunication services). The paper also discusses the potential economic costs arising from these preferential agreements, as well as the potential implications for the multilateral trading system, and for the Doha round of negotiations in particular. The paper concludes by discussing possible approaches to overcome the potential downsides of PTAs, including proposals for a more pro-active role for the WTO in the surveillance of these agreements.

The WTO Agreement on Agriculture applies to those “agricultural products” as defined in its Annex 1. This definition expressly excludes “fish and fish products” from the scope of application of the Agreement. In light of this exclusion, the paper is intended to provide a historical account of the relationship between agricultural products and fishery products in the context of the negotiations leading to and during the GATT period up to the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, and some of its implications for WTO negotiations.