Economic research and trade policy analysis

Commitments in regional trade agreements (RTAs) that fall short of the same countries' obligations under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) are a relatively frequent phenomenon. However, they have gone widely unnoticed in the literature to date and drawn very little attention in relevant WTO fora either. Nevertheless, 'minus commitments' are potentially poisonous and, for various reasons, would deserve close attention. Given the broad definitional scope of the GATS, extending inter alia to commercial presence, such commitments may impinge upon the rights of third-country investors in the RTA economies. Their existence casts doubts on the legal status of the respective agreements under the GATS and can have severe implications for the trading system overall. If not complemented by comprehensive Most-favoured-Nation clauses, the RTAs concerned are disconnected from the WTO and virtually impossible to multilateralize. Based on a review of some 80,000 commitments in 66 agreements, this study seeks to develop a reasonably comprehensive picture of the frequency of 'minus commitments' and their dosage in terms of sectors, measures and modes of supply. It also discusses potential remedies from a WTO perspective.

Policy uncertainty can delay investment and reduce the response to policy change. I provide theoretical and novel quantitative evidence for these effects by focusing on trade policy, a ubiquitous but often overlooked source of uncertainty, when a firm's cost of export market entry is sunk. While an explicit purpose of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is to secure long term market access, little theoretical and empirical work analyzes the value of WTO institutions for reducing uncertainty for prospective exporters. Within a dynamic model of heterogeneous firms, I show that trade policy uncertainty will delay the entry of exporters into new markets and make them less responsive to applied tariff reductions. Policy instruments that reduce or eliminate uncertainty such as binding trade policy commitments at the WTO can increase entry even when applied protection is unchanged. I test the model using a disaggregated and detailed dataset of product level Australian imports in 2004 and 2006. I use the variation in tariffs and binding commitments across countries, products and time, to construct model-consistent measures of uncertainty. The estimates indicate that lower WTO commitments increase entry. Reducing trade policy uncertainty is at least as effective quantitatively as unilateral applied tariff reductions for Australia. These results illuminate and quantify an important new channel for trade creation in the world trade system.

WTO arbitrators rely on economics to establish the permissible retaliation limits authorized by the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) which arguably serves to enforce the overall agreement. We examine how theoretical and quantitative economic analysis has and can be used in this stage of the DSU process. First, we identify, characterize, and categorize the major classes of disputes – e.g., those affecting import protection versus export promotion – and use the Bagwell and Staiger interpretation of the WTO principle of reciprocity to provide a theoretical framework that arbitrators can use to identify the maximum level of retaliatory countermeasures. Second, we allocate each of the ten DSU arbitrations that have taken place thus far into one of these categories and compare the arbitrators’ actual approach with the theory. Third, we use this framework to identify three crucial elements to the arbitrators' decisionmaking process for each case: i) the formula that they decide to adopt for identifying appropriate countermeasures, ii) their political-legal-economic decision on a WTOconsistent counterfactual to use to implement the formula, and iii) the quantitative methods they use to necessarily construct the (unobserved) WTO-consistent counterfactual. We examine not only the arbitrations that have taken place thus far, but our approach also illustrates a template for many additional types of arbitrations likely to take place under the DSU. Finally, in the disputes in which this reciprocity approach has not been used, we identify procedural difficulties that arbitrators confront thus highlighting the constraints that hinder their use of economic analysis in practice.

We estimate the effects of trade facilitation on the extensive margins of trade. Using OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators – which closely reflect the Trade Facilitation Agreement negotiated at the Bali WTO Ministerial Conference of December 2013 – we show that trade facilitation in a given exporting country is positively correlated with the number of products exported by destination and with the number of export destinations served by product. To address the issue of causality, we employ an identification strategy whereby only exports of new products, or exports to new destinations, are taken into account when computing the respective margins of trade. Our findings therefore imply a positive causal impact of trade facilitation on the extensive margins of trade. The results are, to a large extent, robust to alternative definitions of extensive margins, to different sets of controls variables and to various estimation methods. Simulating the effect of an increase to the regional or global median values of trade facilitation, we are able to quantify the potential extensive margin gains of trade facilitation reform in different regions.

Better information on how services policies vary across economies and sectors over time would improve the empirical analysis of their impact. This paper describes the Services Trade Policy Database (STPD), a joint initiative by the World Bank and the WTO Secretariat, which builds on a database developed by the World Bank nearly ten years ago and draws on a recent OECD database.

Bangladesh's international image is not as a popular tourism destination, and many people might be surprised to learn it has three World Heritage sites, including the Sundarbans tiger reserves. Moreover, it is part of important travel circuits for cultural and religious tourism, and has demonstrated potential for sports tourism. The objective of this working paper is to critically test the assertion that pro-poor "green" tourism is one of the best development options for the majority of least developed countries (LDCs) -- a challenging task in Bangladesh in the face of the country's success as an exporter of readymade garments -- by comparing tourism to the available alternatives with regard to the crucial government priorities of export diversification, employment generation and the "green economy". It is well-known that Bangladesh is under strong pressure to diversify its exports, to generate new employment (especially in rural areas), and to respond to critical environmental issues. The government has identified over 30 "thrust sectors" (including tourism) to help address these challenges, but otherwise tourism is rarely mentioned as a major trade and development option for Bangladesh. Within the limitations of data availability, this working paper reaches the conclusion that greater efforts to develop "green" tourism would be highly beneficial for facilitating rural development, environmental and cultural protection, gender equality, and export diversification in services. The most obvious current impediments are inadequate infrastructure, lack of investment and (typically election year) political conflict, but behind these factors appear to be a serious lack of stakeholder coordination, insufficient regulatory and administrative transparency and coherence, as well as some government reluctance to relinquish greater commercial autonomy in tourism to the private sector. This paper offers extensive analysis and some suggestions to help address the impediments, including the recommendation to create a Bangladesh Tourism Stakeholders Forum.

A new information note published by the WTO Secretariat looks at how the COVID-19 pandemic has affected the participation of least-developed countries (LDCs) in global trade. The note stresses that LDCs have seen a significant decline in export earnings due to decreasing demand in key markets, falling commodity prices and a decline in remittances and are likely to be the hardest hit by the crisis due to their limited resources to stimulate growth.

In a rapidly changing trade environment, marked by economic slowdown and impasse in the Doha Round, the success of the WTO in promoting and legitimizing the rules-based multilateral trading system rests, to a large extent, on maintaining effective relations with civil society, including non-governmental organisations. This paper provides an overview of the WTO's rules and practices for transparency and engagement with NGOs. First, it looks at both internal and external transparency. Second, it deals with how the WTO engages with civil society and illustrates how this has evolved over time. Third, it looks at how NGOs and civil society contribute to the dispute settlement process. In concluding, it explores whether there is scope for enhancing the WTO's current practices for engagement with NGOs, and if so how. It also offers some suggestions on how NGOs can render the WTO more accountable to the public. One area in which the WTO's practices for transparency and channels of engagement with civil society actors has evolved considerably is dispute settlement. Although only WTO members can bring a dispute to the WTO, the practice of opening hearings to the public, upon the parties' request, and inviting contributions from non-members, including NGOs, shows to what extent WTO transparency and engagement with civil society have improved in recent times. In particular, NGOs have assisted parties to a dispute prepare their briefs. This has included annexing studies to the parties's submissions, submitting amicus curiae briefs, and supporting the panel as experts under Article 13 of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). Forging links with civil society is a formidable task for any intergovernmental organization; at issue are the rights of governments to set WTO policy and the need to respect the voices of those without a vote. Although the WTO's rules for engagement with civil society based on Article V:2 of the Marrakesh Agreement and further elaborated in the 1996 Guidelines have not been updated, the actual practices for engagement have evolved considerably over time and it is likely that they will continue to be improved upon in the future.

This paper deals with claims, recently raised in various circles, that structural faults in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) have prevented WTO Members from advancing services liberalization under the Agreement. The GATS is generally associated in this context with a bottom-up (positive-list) scheduling approach where the sectors on which trade commitments are undertaken are selected individually. This is claimed to be less efficient, in terms of liberalization effects, than alternative approaches under which everything is considered to be fully committed unless specifically excluded (top-down or negative listing). However, a closer look at services negotiations conducted in various settings, including the Doha-Round process, WTO accession cases and different types of regional trade agreements, suggests that such structural issues have limited, if any, impact on the results achieved. What ultimately matters are not negotiating or scheduling techniques, but the political impetus that the governments concerned are ready to generate.

This paper investigates how RTAs treat disputes concerning their TBT provisions, in particular whether they treat them differently from other types of dispute, and how they deal with any potential overlap with the WTO when the substantive obligations of the RTA and the WTO TBT Agreement are the same (or similar).

This paper brings together three strands of literature on the determinants of international trade – distance, formal, and informal institutions – to explain differences in export performance across countries. Using an augmented gravity model, we find that the importance of formal institutions (rule of law) for bilateral trade increases with distance.

The WTO TBT Agreement obliges governments to use international standards as a basis for regulation, yet leaves a degree of flexibility with respect to the choice of standard, and the manner of its use. This interplay between obligation and flexibility has given rise to tension in various fora of the WTO. This paper brings together these three distinct strands of WTO work to illustrate core aspects of the international standards debate at the WTO. In our analysis we first briefly outline the nature of the discipline in the TBT Agreement itself; next, we describe where and how the discussion arises in the WTO; and, finally, explore some implications of governance of international standard setting. We propose that greater regulatory alignment could be achieved through a renewed focus on the procedures of setting international standards (the how), and greater emphasis on robust technical/scientific underpinnings of such standards (the what).

The objective of this paper is to assess the adequacy of multilateral rules dealing with monopolies and state enterprises, particularly in the domain of services. This paper argues that since these rules depend largely on the other obligations undertaken by Members, a variety of exemptions and exclusions have weakened the rules considerably. Furthermore, liberalization of services trade, aided by negotiations under the GATS, is leading to changes in market structure and the pattern of ownership. These changes imply that government-mandated monopolies or non-competing oligopolies are disappearing from the infrastructural services for which Article VIII of GATS is most relevant. The behaviour of dominant suppliers that often remain does not fall within the scope of Article VIII and has been addressed by creating other disciplines. The paper assesses how much emphasis needs to be placed on pro-competitive regulation to ensure competitive market conditions and argues that there is a need to strengthen Article VIII and widen its scope to deal with certain generic problems.

Women are likely to be harder hit than men by trade disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the dangers are particularly acute in developing countries according to a new information note from the WTO Secretariat. The paper points to how governments’ policy responses could address gender-specific effects of the crisis.

Global Manufacturing and International Supply Chains changed the way trade and international economics are understood today. The present essay builds on recent statistical advances to suggest new ways of looking at the demand and supply side approaches when Global Value Chains (GVCs) — articulating supply and demand chains from an international perspective-are taken into consideration. This pilot case focuses on the G-20 countries, a group of leading developed and developing economies which took a prominent role in fostering and managing global economic governance. The paper is organised into two independent parts. The demand dynamics is first analysed through a growth-accounting decomposition, then through the long term determinants of income elasticity of imports. The second part looks at the implications of global manufacturing for our understanding of the supply-side growth dynamics, privileging a trade perspective: the definition of comparative advantages and the potential for value-chain up-grading.

The main purpose of the paper is to present the coverage of SPS systems in SSA countries by TPR reports, and their main findings. It also opens the discussion as to whether the SPS analytical framework in TPR reports has been sufficiently comprehensive and beneficial in guiding technical assistance (TPR follow-up) activities in SSA. At the outset, we briefly present the strategic importance of agriculture in SSA countries, with a description of the link between an effective SPS regulatory system and the performance of agriculture.

A little over a decade has passed since the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008. Shortly after the collapse of the Lehman Brothers investment bank, an internal Secretariat Task Force was established by the WTO Director-General to monitor the trade-related developments associated with the crisis. Meeting in London in early 2009, the G20 Leaders mandated the WTO, together with other international bodies, to monitor and report publicly on G20 adherence to resisting protectionism and promoting global trade and investment. Since then, 22 G20 reports and 24 WTO-wide reports have been published.

This paper is a literature survey of some relevant issues arising from environmental quality provision and eco-labelling schemes. First of all it is shown how the two topics are strictly related. Firms adopting a production process (or producing a good) more environmentally friendly than others (environmental quality provision aspect) may want to make it public (eco-labelling aspect). The survey addresses the question of optimal environmental quality provision (also as a policy tool) and firms compliance. With regard to eco-labelling, its impacts on market structure are analysed. It hasn’t been possible to consider all issues, like for example that of moral hazard in providing non truthful information. Different issues related to trade are also analysed, even if the literature is not abundant on this yet. In the literature both aspects, of environmental quality provision and eco-labelling, are analysed using product differentiation models. The usual result is that multiple equilibria arise depending also on the parameters. Models are also not robust to different assumptions. Environmental quality provision and eco-labelling are also compared to more traditional policy instruments like taxes (or subsidies) and standards. From the empirical evidence it can be concluded that information plays a crucial role both for consumers’ and producers’ decisions. Consumers are willing to pay a higher price to be informed about the greenness of a good, and a label can really be a determinant in their choice of which brand to purchase. On the supply side, disclosing information about the environmental performance of a firm can affect investment decisions and its stock value.

This paper examines the interplay between exchange rate regimes and policies and commercial policy in six transition economies. In all these economies the rate of protection afforded domestic industry by the exchange rate has been eroded by high rates of inflation and insufficient growth in productivity. As a result, there has been pressure on governments to increase trade barriers and each country examined has had recourse to various means of restricting imports. We argue that more flexible management of the nominal exchange rate would be a preferable way of dealing with the real appreciation of these countries’ currencies.

This paper analyses the role of services in international trade through the lens of global value chains (GVCs). Services account for more than 70% of world GDP but only for around 20% of world trade in balance of payments terms. In value added terms, accounting for services embodied in exported goods, services account for 40% of world trade. Services industries increasingly produce in networked or "fragmented" arrangements. The paper lays out conceptual and measurement issues related to services networks and provides evidence based on trade in value added statistics and on a case study on the film industry. In contrast to goods value chains, services networks appear less fragmented internationally based on trade in value added statistics and survey evidence. However, to better capture the international services fragmentation, advances in statistics by enterprise characteristics and by mode of supply, i.e. taking into account the movement of labour and capital, are required.

This paper studies the effects of trade policy uncertainty on the extensive and the intensive margins of trade for a sample of 149 exporters at the HS6 digit level. We measure trade policy uncertainty as the gap between binding tariff commitments under trade agreements (multilateral and regional agreements) and applied tariffs- what is also known as tariffs’ water. Our results show that trade policy uncertainty is an important barrier to export. On average the elimination of water increases the probability of exporting by 12 percent. A one percent decrease of water also increases export volumes by one percent. We also find that the negative impact of trade policy uncertainty is higher for countries with low quality of institutions and in the presence of global value chains. Finally, our findings show that on average trade policy uncertainty is equivalent to a level of tariffs between 1.7 and 8.7 percentage points.

It has become increasingly common to produce goods in a number of geographically dispersed stages linked by international trade. This tendency, known by names such as “production fragmentation”, “processing trade”, and “vertical specialization”, has important implications for the analysis of non-tariff measures (NTMs) and trade facilitation. First, different types of NTMs or trade facilitation issues are naturally associated with different stages in the movement of goods. Different price gaps can be assigned to these stages, making it possible to decompose the overall amount of distortion and to prioritize the policies with the largest potential efficiency gains. Second, NTMs may accumulate in long supply chains, implying that their trade-distorting effects are greater for goods produced in a fragmented manner than for goods with simple production processes. There is evidence that trade costs are more important for high technology goods or goods undergoing several stages of processing. Issues with product standards may be particularly important for goods with long supply chains. The link between NTMs and supply chains also has implications for economic development and for the relationship between liberalization in services and goods.

The paper discusses a number of issues related to the treatment of trade credit internationally, a priori (treatment by banking regulators) and a posteriori (treatment by debtors and creditors in the case of default), which are currently of interest to the trade finance community, in particular the traditional providers of trade credit and guarantees, such as banks, export credit agencies, regional development banks, and multilateral agencies. The paper does not deal with the specific issue of regulation of official insured-export credit, under the OECD Arrangement, which is a specific matter left out of this analysis. Traditionally, trade finance has received preferred treatment on the part of national and international regulators, as well as by international financial agencies in the treatment of trade finance claims, on grounds that trade finance was one of the safest, most collateralized, and selfliquidating forms of trade finance. Preferred treatment of trade finance also reflects the systemic importance of trade, as in sovereign or private defaults a priority is to "treat" expeditiously trade lines of credits to allow for such credit to be restored and trade to flow again. It is not only a matter of urgency for essential imports to be financed, but also a pre-condition for economic recovery, as the resumption of trade is necessary for ailing countries to restore balance of payments equilibrium. The relatively favourable treatment received by trade finance was reflected in the moderate rate of capitalization for cross-border trade credit in the form of letters of credit and similar securitized instruments under the Basel I regulatory framework, put in place in the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, as the banking and regulatory communities moved towards internal-rating based and risk-weighted assets systems under the successor Basel II framework, a number of complaints emerged with respect to the treatment of trade credit – particularly in periods of crisis. Issues of pro-cyclicality, maturity structure and country risk have been discussed at some length in various fora, including in the WTO at the initiative of Members. Part of the issue was that Basel II regulation was designed and implemented in a manner that, in periods of banking retrenchment, seemed to have affected the supply of trade credit more than other potentially more risky forms of lending. With the collapse of trade in late 2008 and early 2009, the regulatory treatment of trade credit under Basel II clearly became an issue and was discussed by professional banking organizations, regulators and international financial institutions. A sentence made its headway into the communiqué of G-20 Leaders in London in April 2009, calling upon regulators to exercise some flexibility in the application of Basel II rules, in support of trade finance. As the issue of removing the obstacles to the supply of trade finance spread became part of the public debate, discussions with respect to the regulatory treatment of trade finance in the context of the making of "Basel III" rules are now raising political attention. Part of the underlying problem regarding the design of regulation of trade finance is that banking regulators may not have enough understanding of the way that trade and trade finance operate in practice. In turn, the banking community has made insufficient progress in explaining these issues to regulators and in providing evidence about the high level of safety and soundness of their activity, in collecting statistical information and even in defining clearly what comprises trade finance. This paper aims at clarifying such issues. The WTO, in its role as an "honest broker", is trying to help the parties concerned, and has been asked from time to time to act as a go-between between the two communities, in order to clarify issues. Section 1 looks at the overall Basel framework and its evolution over time, with particular emphasis on the regulation of trade finance. Section 2 looks at issues raised in the WTO context by the trading and trade finance communities, be it by WTO Members or by experts, and how this has helped to clarify some of the disputed issues. Section 3 raises a number of questions which need clarification from the trade finance community for regulators to be able to better capture the reality of trade finance operations, and allow them to regulate with full understanding of its implications.

This document provides a technical description of the WTO Global Trade Model developed by the Center for Global Trade Analysis (GTAP) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). The model can be used to generate global trade projections and to assess the medium and long run effects of a wide range of global and national trade policies.

There are various conceivable links between services liberalization and poverty reduction, including the efficiency effects associated with increased competition in intermediate (infrastructural) services, income transfers generated by workers moving abroad, or the mobilization of private investment for social policy purposes. Arguably the most promising option for interested governments, regardless of complementary moves by trading partners, is the opening of, and creation of favourable investment conditions in, core infrastructural services. However, apart from basic telecommunications, both the Uruguay Round schedules and the offers submitted in the Doha Round to date have remained disappointing in this respect. Effective services liberalization, as measured by the share of phase-in commitments in total commitments, has occurred mainly in the context of WTO accessions and Preferential Trade Agreements. Given the apparent lack of political impetus in broader-based trade rounds, this article discusses options how the submission of more meaningful offers could be encouraged.

In recent years, our understanding of the nature of energy price shocks and their effects on the economy has evolved dramatically. Only a few years ago, the prevailing view in the literature was that at least the major crude oil prices increases were exogenous with respect to the OECD economies and that these increases were caused by oil supply disruptions triggered by political disturbances in the Middle East. This view has little empirical support. Likewise, the popular notion that OPEC constitutes a cartel that controls the price of oil has not held up to scrutiny. At the same time, there has been increasing recognition of the importance of shifts in the demand for oil. Recent research has provided robust evidence that oil demand shocks played a central role in all major oil price shock episodes since the 1970s.

Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic there has been a discussion among researchers and policy makers about changes to global value chains, both about expected changes and changes that should be promoted by government policies. In this paper we conduct an in-depth analysis of the reasons for changes in global value chains as a result of COVID-19 both from a positive angle, analysing expected changes in the behaviour of firms, and from a normative angle, assessing the different arguments for policy interventions by governments. After this analysis international cooperation of trade policies and the role of WTO in crises like the COVID-19 pandemic is explored.

The EU's import policies towards developing countries are complex, stemming from important sectoral and country variations in policy. Average tariffs are modest, and, while there are tariff peaks and escalation in some areas of interest to developing countries, these are being reduced as a result of the implementation of the results of the Uruguay Round. The use of non-tariff measures has fallen, particularly as a result of agricultural tariffication, and is being further reduced in textiles and clothing. The elimination of VERs has not led to an increase in the use of alternative measures. Contingency protection falls more heavily in chemicals, iron and steel, certain textile items and certain electrical consumer goods and on Asian, Central and Eastern European and former Soviet Union countries. The operation of various factors appears to be working to mitigate the use of trade defence measures in recent years, helping to counter pressures that seem likely to arise as liberalization proceeds.

To date, government procurement has been effectively carved out of the main multilateral rules of the WTO system. This paper examines the systemic and other ramifications of this exclusion, from both an economic and a legal point of view. In addition to relevant elements of the WTO Agreements, particularly the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), it derives insights from a large number of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) that embody substantive provisions on both government procurement and services trade. An important finding is that, from an economic perspective, general market access commitments with respect to services trade and commitments regarding government procurement of services are complementary and mutually reinforcing. In contrast, from a legal point of view and at the multilateral level, disciplines in the two areas have been "divided up" into two Agreements with different (but complementary) spheres of application: the key provisions regarding the scope of application of the GATS and the GPA make clear that each serves purposes that the other does not. Analysis of corresponding provisions of RTAs broadly supports and extends this finding. In light of the foregoing, a question arises as to possible ways of deepening disciplines in this area. Part 5 sets out, for reflection, several related options: (i) the built-in mandate in the GATS for negotiations on services procurement (Article XIII:2); (ii) "multilateralization" of the GPA; (iii) the eactivation of work in the (currently inactive) WTO Working Group on Transparency in Government Procurement; and (iv) the taking up of relevant issues in the context of bilateral or regional negotiations. Overall, we find that each of these possibilities has potential merits, though none is without related challenges.

As of November 2010, more than 300 regional trade agreements (RTAs) were in force. Approximately two-thirds of them had been notified to the WTO. Each of these RTAs had, implicitly or explicitly, established a regional legal framework for the application of intra-regional, and sometimes extra-regional, antidumping actions. This study focuses on intra-regional antidumping regimes and has been built around the analysis of antidumping provisions in 192 RTAs. This Working Paper first recalls the main constitutive elements of the multilateral and regional legal frameworks, a pre-requisite to consider if these rules and disciplines are competing with or are complementary to multilateral disciplines. Based on an analysis of these 192 RTAs, the Paper identifies two Categories of regional antidumping regimes, and assesses their relationships with the multilateral rules. Particular attention is paid to antidumping regimes in RTAs, which appear to "diverge" from the WTO disciplines. The Paper concludes that most regional antidumping regimes do not fundamentally change the Parties' rights to take antidumping measures, as compared with the multilateral regime. There appears to be no evidence that regional antidumping regimes increase RTA partners' rights to take antidumping actions at the intra-RTA level, and only a minority of regimes contains disciplines which diverge from multilateral rules, though most of those do not result in fundamental changes in the antidumping patterns of the RTA Parties. The Paper notes, however, that deep integration among a few RTAs has been decisive in bringing about a substantial change in the antidumping patterns of the RTA Parties concerned. It finds that legal consolidation, at the regional level, of a current practice of not using antidumping as a trade policy tool is restricted to a limited number of Parties. A few others seem to have used RTAs to restrict the possibility of using anti-dumping between RTA partners, as compared to multilateral rules. The Paper finally suggests that the proliferation of regional transparency mechanisms, related to antidumping may potentially undermine the oversight role of the multilateral trading system if "information diversion" materializes.

This paper attempts to fill a gap in the trade literature by providing a comprehensive overview of services liberalization commitments in the new generation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) as compared to prevailing GATS commitments and Doha Round offers. By developing a new database, the paper reviews the commitments undertaken by 29 WTO Members (counting the EC as one) under mode 1 (cross-border supply) and mode 3 (commercial presence) in 28 PTAs negotiated since 2000. The paper presents a general analysis from both a cross-country and cross-sector perspectives, and also examines in more detail the GATS+ commitments undertaken in a number of key sectors (audiovisual, distribution, education, financial, professional, and telecommunication services). The paper also discusses the potential economic costs arising from these preferential agreements, as well as the potential implications for the multilateral trading system, and for the Doha round of negotiations in particular. The paper concludes by discussing possible approaches to overcome the potential downsides of PTAs, including proposals for a more pro-active role for the WTO in the surveillance of these agreements.

The WTO Agreement on Agriculture applies to those “agricultural products” as defined in its Annex 1. This definition expressly excludes “fish and fish products” from the scope of application of the Agreement. In light of this exclusion, the paper is intended to provide a historical account of the relationship between agricultural products and fishery products in the context of the negotiations leading to and during the GATT period up to the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, and some of its implications for WTO negotiations.

Since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1994 and the creation of the WTO in 1995, the functioning of the multilateral trading system has been the focus of a considerable number of articles, proposals and debates. With the exception of a few important initiatives on transparency and decisionmaking, most contributions on the functioning of the WTO have been made by external observers of the WTO. However, over the past two years, an increasing number of Members have showed interest in systemic and institutional issues. This interest has to a large extent been generated by a concern about the role of the multilateral trading system in the overall international economic environment, particularly in light of the current global financial crisis. At the same time, the WTO as an institution is under considerable pressure following more than a decade of efforts to conclude the Doha Round of trade negotiations. This paper explores the possibility of establishing a Working Party on the Functioning of the WTO as a separate, deliberative process in the WTO. It seeks to outline the advantages of creating an informal forum or space for discussion among WTO Members and argues that many WTO Members appear to be ready for a broad discussion of institutional and systemic challenges facing the multilateral trading system.

This paper reviews the different types of provisions explicitly addressing electronic commerce (e-commerce) in regional trade agreements (RTAs). The analysis covers the 275 RTAs currently in force and notified to the WTO as of May 2017.

Transition economies are going through a process of changing the role of the state, allowing a greater role for the private sector. This is consistent with the market-oriented approach of the WTO. Remaining state agencies and enterprises will need to adapt their ways of doing business, including in their approach to procurement of goods and services, for economic and legal reasons. There is some hesitation about privatization, as for foreign direct investment, and, where accepted, about the precise timing. Where privatization of basic service monopolies occurs, the role of the state shifts towards a regulatory function. In some private sector activities, a non-interventionist approach to competition may be justified by market considerations, while in others a pro-active policy may be necessary to ensure the benefits of economic liberalization.

This paper presents a discussion of the potential channels through which international trade affects the position of low skilled workers in the European Union. After an analysis of the European Union's trade flows showing the predominant role of intra-industry trade with other industrialised countries, the discussion focuses on the potential effects of intra-industry trade on low skilled labour. Particular attention is paid to possible interactions between trade and technological change and to the possible effects of trade on the price elasticity of labour. The paper also discusses how trade may affect incentives to invest in skills and thus a country's potential to alter the skill structure of its working force.

Despite being a leading export sector and source of foreign exchange for most (non-oil exporting) LDCs, tourism never makes the headlines of the WTO's Doha Development Agenda negotiations. When tourism's impressive potential for poverty alleviation is considered, the lack of attention is even more striking. Reasons for the apparent neglect are complex, and include a lack of awareness of tourism as an export sector, the fragmented nature of the industry and low political influence, exaggerated concerns over "leakages", misunderstandings about poverty alleviation and tourism, and the "poker playing" characteristic of trade negotiations. The evident results are missed opportunities to address services infrastructure constraints (one of the greatest impediments to increasing LDC tourism revenues and value-added), as well as a failure to address sufficiently tourism's agricultural, industrial, and Aid for Trade linkages. Existing national-level investment promotion objectives, as well as DTIS and TPR reports can be helpful for identifying priorities for both GATS negotiations and Aid for Trade. The focus should not necessarily be on making GATS commitments, but rather on ensuring that the importance of tourism for LDCs is acknowledged and acted upon. Indeed, governments can always further liberalize on a unilateral basis; in the context of the DDA, however, they can request greater access to trading partners' markets in exchange, as well as gain valuable international attention and publicity.

The paper first surveys the Trade Facilitation landscape at the regional level and analyses the main forces shaping it. It identifies key factors driving regional Facilitation approaches, examining their priorities, features and underlying philosophies. The study also highlights significant trends in regional Trade Facilitation provisions and analyses their implications. The paper then compares regional and multilateral initiatives, looking at areas of convergence and divergence, and highlighting where potential gaps exist. It analyses negotiating positions in the respective frameworks and discusses both the benefits and limitations of the resulting Trade Facilitation provisions. Examining the impact of the recently concluded WTO Agreement, the study highlights its potential value added.

This paper tries to assess quantitatively the role of electronic commerce in economic activity and in trade and tariff revenue collection. The share of value added that potentially lends itself to electronic trade represents around 30 percent of GDP, most importantly distribution, finance and business services. Electronic commerce is also likely to boost trade in many services sectors significantly. Despite the growing importance of electronic commerce for economic activity and trade, tariff revenue loss from electronic commerce is likely to be minimal. Trade in potentially digitizable media goods which currently faces a tariff in some countries represents less than one percent of total world trade. The revenue collected on these products amounts to less than one percent of total tariff revenue in most countries. Even if some of this trade moved “online”, tariff revenue loss would be only a very small share of tariff revenue.

This paper analyzes the reasons why countries may pursue different labeling policies in autarky and how this affects countries’ welfare in the context of international trade. In an asymmetric information environment where producers know the quality of the goods they are selling and consumers are not able to distinguish between them, the quality governments choose to protect by a label depends on consumer preferences for and production costs of different qualities. Countries with different distributions of tastes and/or different production functions will thus decide to label differently. When they trade, welfare effects will be different on the country as a whole and on different types of consumers within each country depending on whether countries choose to mutually recognize each others labeling policy or to harmonize their policies. In particular it will be the case that a country with weak preferences for high quality will oppose the introduction of an international, harmonized label as it is better off under a regime of mutual recognition. When countries only differ in their costs of producing quality instead, none of the trading partners will lose from a move towards trade under an international, harmonized label.

What is the value of the WTO Committee on Agriculture? How much trade do countries talk about at the WTO? Do low-income countries participate less than they should in the work of the Committee? How important are issues not covered by notifications? What are the most important issues on which to focus negotiations?

to identify underlying sources of growth or decline. A key feature is that the unit of analysis (e.g. a city, a region or a country) exists within a broader frame of reference that strongly influences it (e.g. a national productive system or the world economy). It is based on the principle that total change can be disaggregated into contributing factors and any change that can not be accounted for by these factors can be interpreted as the "local contribution" to that total change. This method has been subject to many refinements. Because the objectives of this paper are both didactic and analytic, traditional Shift-Share Analysis is applied to international trade. It uses the "constant market share" assumption by decomposing the growth of exports into four separate components: a global component (GLOBO) indicating changes due to overall growth of world trade, a geographical component (GEO) indicating changes due to the country's distribution of trading partners, a product composition component (COMPO) indicating growth due to the mix of products exported, and a residual term (the "local" contribution) indicating changes in competitiveness, or performance (PERFO). The first 3 components, GLOBO, COMPO and GEO all relate to the "expected change in trade" should trade change proportionally. The fourth and residual component, PERFO, refers to that part of the change in trade that "shifts away" from expected proportional changes, hence the term "Shift-Share Analysis". This paper will analyse a change or "shift" in shares in trade (particularly exports) of different economies. By focusing on selected time periods and using the PERFO indicator, the method will show what industries shift away from the expected change in trade, which economies have experienced such shifts in their industries, and to which regions.

Services is the fastest-growing sector of today's global economy and trade in services is the most dynamic segment of world trade. However, its potential remains constrained by a variety of barriers: trade costs are estimated to be almost double those in goods, and more than 40% of trade costs are accounted for by regulation-related factors. Regulatory measures related to the permission to supply a service, i.e. those related to licensing and qualifications requirements and procedures, and technical standards, can particularly affect service suppliers' ability to trade. With a view to mitigating the unintended trade-restrictive effects of such measures, since 2017, a group of Members has been negotiating a set of regulatory disciplines in the context of the Joint Initiative on Services Domestic Regulation.

We examine in this paper the impact of the tightening of IPRs, notably patents rights, and the adoption of utility model laws on export diversification. To perform our analysis, we used panel data covering 89 developing and developed countries (of which 55 developing countries) over the period 1975 – 2003, and Lewbel (-2012-)'s instrumental variable technique. Our results lead us to conclude that for developing countries, legal protection for minor and adaptive inventions could be a springboard for further strengthening of IPRs protection in spurring export diversification, which is essential for the structural change needed for their economic development.

In September 2015, Heads of State and Government will gather in New York to agree the post-2015 development agenda. The role that trade will play in this agenda is neither clear, nor agreed. Yet an open, non-discriminatory, rules-based multilateral trading system underpins sustainable development - a concept that lies at the core of much of the post-2015 debate to date. Indeed, sustainable development is recognized as an objective in the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO). With the aim of stimulating discussion, this paper asks the question of how trade, and WTO rules, can contribute to the post-2015 development agenda? In reply, the author offers some thoughts on 10 contributions that trade, and WTO rules, can make to the post 2015 development agenda. The list is indicative, not exhaustive. The 10 contributions highlight the complex way in which trade and trade policy interact with the evolving debate on the post-2015 development agenda - a debate which encompasses issues ranging from poverty eradication, inclusive growth, climate change mitigation, decent work, food security, access to health services and sustainable development financing, to name but a few of the topics under consideration. The paper organizes the 10 indicative contributions around three headings: trade rules as part of the enabling environment for the achievement of the post-2015 development agenda; the role that trade, and trade policy, can play in meeting specific goals (including possible Sustainable Development Goals); and the contribution that Aid for Trade can make.

Over the past months, it has become increasingly clear that the services negotiations under the Doha Development Agenda will not produce significant improvements on current commitments unless major new impetus is provided. In an introductory section, this paper discusses various impediments, from the perspective of participating governments, that may explain the lack of negotiating momentum to date. It then provides an overview of existing commitments under the GATS (by sector, mode of supply, and level of development) and of the initial offers that had been tabled by early 2005. Despite the substantial benefits that may be associated with the liberalization of services trade, the GATS has obviously not yet lived up to ambitious expectations. For example, on average across all WTO Members, only one-third of all services sectors have been included in current schedules of commitments; and many entries have been combined with significant limitations on market access and national treatment or with the complete exclusion of particular types of transactions (modes of supply) from coverage. While the ongoing services negotiations provide an opportunity to complement the rule-making efforts of the Uruguay Round with genuine market opening, many governments apparently have found it difficult, despite generally more restrictive access regimes and, thus, potentially higher gains from liberalization than in merchandise trade, to undertake or envisage economically significant bindings across a broad range of services. Five years after the inception of the services round, current negotiating arrangements, based mainly on (bilateral) exchanges of requests and offers, may need to be complemented by common points of reference to provide greater focus and guidance.

The Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO recognizes the need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries and especially the least developed among them secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development.This article discusses how the WTO contributes to facilitating Africa’s integration into the WTO multilateral trading system. It is argued that, while African countries are actively engaged in the work of the WTO, securing their economic and policy interests, some main challenges remain. These include the need to further diversify production, linking to the Global Value Chains and developing adequate infra-structures facilitating digital trade as a vehicle for economic growth.

In this paper I sketch out the rough contours of the challenge faced by the WTO in dealing with non-tariff measures (NTMs) as seen from the economic theories of trade agreements. The key questions for the WTO - the answers to which largely dictate the choice between shallow and deep approaches to integration – appear to be two: (1) Is it the terms-of-trade problem or the commitment problem that WTO member governments seek to solve with their WTO membership?; and (2) Is it market clearing or offshoring/bilateral bargaining that is now the most prominent mechanism for the determination of international prices? I suggest that evidence on the first question points to the terms-of-trade theory and hence toward shallow integration, but that answering the second question may be the key to identifying the best way forward on NTMs for the WTO.

This paper develops a set of time series models to provide short-term forecasts (6 to 18 months ahead) of international trade both at the global level and for selected regions. Our results compare favourably to other forecasts, notably by the International Monetary Fund, as measured by standard evaluation measures, such as the root mean square forecast error. In comparison to other models, our approach offers several methodological advantages, inter alia, a focus on import growth as the core variable, the avoidance of certain difficulties affecting the performance of structural models, the selection of variables and lags on the basis of theoretical considerations and empirical testing as well as a full documentation of the modelling process.

The objective of this manuscript is to serve as a practical guide for estimations with the structural gravity model. After a brief review of the theoretical foundations, we summarize the main challenges with gravity estimations and we review the solutions to address those challenges. Then, we integrate the latest developments in the empirical gravity literature and we offer six recommendations to obtain reliable partial equilibrium estimates of the effects of bilateral and non-discriminatory trade policies within the same comprehensive, and theoretically-consistent econometric specification. Our recommendations apply equally to analyses with aggregate and disaggregated data. Interpretation, consistent aggregation methods, and data challenges and sources for gravity estimations are discussed as well. Empirical exercises demonstrate the usefulness, validity, and applicability of our methods.